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ABSTRACT
When the superstar athlete—“Iron Mike” Webster—a nine-time National
Football League (NFL) Pro Bowler, four-time Super Bowl Champion, Hall
of Fame center for the Pittsburgh Steelers—died at age fifty with severe
brain dysfunction after becoming homeless and living in a truck, it was
discovered he had a previously nameless disease, Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy (CTE). The discovery of CTE opened the floodgates on
interest in delayed manifestation brain diseases caused by repeated blows
to the head. As part of that flood, many retired NFL players brought numerous
class actions against the NFL for their alleged brain diseases caused by
the repeated blows to the head they received while playing in the NFL.
That litigation recently settled with the NFL’s liability totaling approximately
$1 billion, and now the battle over who will pay that $1 billion liability is
being fought between the NFL and more than thirty of the NFL’s insurers
in a New York state court (the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation).
This Article is the first scholarly effort to analyze the NFL v. Insurance
Industry litigation. In doing so, it provides a battlefield map regarding the
principal legal issues that will govern the outcome of the NFL v. Insurance
Industry litigation: (1) choice of law, (2) “trigger,” (3) “allocation,” (4) “number
of occurrences,” and (5) the “expected or intended” exclusion. The Article
then compares and contrasts the law on these issues for New York, the state
in which the NFL v. Insurance Industry is being litigated, and Pennsylvania,
the state in which the underlying NFL players’ class actions were adjudicated,
and predicts potential outcomes under each state’s laws.
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INTRODUCTION
A homeless man in Pittsburgh lived alone in a truck with one of its
windows replaced with a garbage bag and duct tape.1 He had lost a lot of
money before becoming homeless, but he could not remember how that
occurred.2 He often forgot to eat, and when he did eat his diet routinely
consisted of Pringles and Little Debbie pecan rolls.3 He used Super Glue
to hold his rotting teeth in place.4 In order to sleep, he used a Taser gun to
knock himself unconscious.5 Sometimes he laid catatonic in the fetal position
for days.6 The man died at age fifty.7
Who was this unfortunate man? He was a super star athlete—“Iron Mike”
Webster. Iron Mike was a nine-time NFL Pro Bowler, four-time Super Bowl
Champion, Hall of Fame center for the Pittsburgh Steelers for fifteen years.8
It has been estimated that he received approximately 25,000 blows to the
head over the course of his career.9 By the time his life prematurely ended
at age fifty, brain tau proteins plagued his brain like brain sludge—clogging
up brain function and killing brain cells that controlled for mood, emotions,
and executive functioning.10 An autopsy revealed that Iron Mike suffered
from a brain disease now known as Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy
(CTE).11
Iron Mike is not alone. Since he died, scientists have discovered that a
high percentage of NFL players have CTE or other types of delayed

1. See Greg Garber, A Tormented Soul, ESPN (Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.espn.com/
nfl/news/story?id=1972285 [https://perma.cc/FV7P-WHQK] [hereinafter Garber, A Tormented
Soul]; Jeanne Marie Laskas, Bennet Omalu, Concussions, and the NFL: How One Doctor
Changed Football Forever, GQ (Sept. 14, 2009, 8:01 PM), http://www.gq.com/story/nfl
players-brain-dementia-study-memory-concussions [https://perma.cc/GN9C-R7AJ].
2. See Laskas, supra note 1.
3. See Laskas, supra note 1; see also Greg Garber, Wandering through the Fog,
ESPN (Jan. 27, 2005), http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972288 [https://perma.cc/
PLJ5-NBQP] [hereinafter Garber, Wandering Through the Fog].
4. See Garber, Wandering Through the Fog, supra note 3; Laskas, supra note 1.
5. Laskas, supra note 1.
6. Garber, A Tormented Soul, supra note 1.
7. See Garber, A Tormented Soul, supra note 1; Laskas, supra note 1.
8. See Laskas, supra note 1.
9. Id.; see also Greg Garber, Blood and Guts, ESPN (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.
espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972286 [https://perma.cc/PH74-FYZJ].
10. See Laskas, supra note 1.
11. Id.
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manifestation brain diseases when they die.12 Indeed, so many former NFL
players have such brain diseases that former players filed numerous class
actions against the NFL.13 The player class encompassed by the litigation
totals approximately 20,000 former NFL players.14 The parties recently settled,
and the NFL agreed to pay a settlement valued at approximately $1 billion.15
The NFL, in turn, sought coverage from more than thirty of the biggest
insurance companies in the world that sold Comprehensive General
Liability (CGL) insurance policies to the NFL between 1968 and 2012.16
When the insurers refused to pay, litigation between the NFL and its insurers
ensued with competing lawsuits filed by insurers in New York state court
and by the NFL in California state court.17 The California state court stayed
the NFL’s lawsuit in favor of the insurers’ New York litigation.18
This Article addresses five major issues most likely to dictate the outcome
of this battle of the titans (the NFL v. Insurance Industry): (1) choice of law,
(2) “trigger,” (3) “allocation,” (4) “number of occurrences,” and (5) the
“expected or intended” exclusion. Resolution of these issues will determine
which insurers, if any, are responsible for the NFL’s defense and indemnity
costs and what amounts each insurer will be required to pay.
Choice of law is the question of which jurisdiction’s laws should govern
the dispute. State law generally governs insurance disputes, and the laws
vary significantly from state to state.19 The insurers likely will argue that

12. See, e.g., Turner v. NFL (In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury
Litig.), 307 F.R.D. 351, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Accepting the findings in the McKee Study
as accurate, at least 89% of the former NFL players studied by Dr. Stern, Dr. McKee, and
their colleagues would have been compensated under the [NFL] settlement [for long-term
brain injuries] while living.”), aff’d, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016); Laskas, supra note 1
(“[A] UNC follow-up [study] in 2005 . . . showed that repeatedly concussed NFL players
had five times the rate of ‘mild cognitive impairment,’ or pre-Alzheimer’s disease. That
study showed retired NFL players suffering Alzheimer’s disease at an alarming 37 percent
higher rate than the average guy walking down the street.”).
13. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 421
(3d Cir. 2016).
14. Id. at 420.
15. Id. at 447.
16. See Nat’l Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318,
326 (Ct. App. 2013).
17. See id. at 325; Alterra Am. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Football League, Civ. No.
652813/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2012); Discover Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Nat’l Football
League, Civ. No. 652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012).
18. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 348.
19. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 68 (5th ed. 2012) (“In essence, the McCarran-Ferguson Act gave
supremacy to state regulation of the business of insurance . . . .”); PETER J. KALIS ET AL.,
POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 26.03[B] (1st ed. 1997
& Supp. 2016) (“Insurance contracts are interpreted according to state law. Not surprisingly,
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New York law, the forum state and the NFL’s headquarters, should control
because New York generally is viewed as the most insurer-friendly state
in the country.20 The NFL likely will argue for the law of one or more other
states that favor its position. Of the many potential states the NFL could
argue governs the dispute, this Article will consider Pennsylvania law, the
jurisdiction that handled the underlying players’ class action litigation, as
an alternative to New York law. Winning the choice of law battle between
New York and Pennsylvania could largely dictate the outcome of the entire
dispute because of the differences between New York’s and Pennsylvania’s
insurance laws.21
“Trigger” is the insurance term used to describe what must occur in
order to implicate an insurer’s obligations under its policy.22 The CGL policies
at issue in the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation are “occurrence”
based policies, which means the injury for which the policyholder seeks
coverage must occur during the insurer’s policy period in order for the
insurer to have any obligations with respect to the policyholder’s liabilities.23
Each insurer likely will argue that the injuries at issue in the NFL players’
concussion litigation either predate or postdate their policies or that the
policyholder cannot prove when the injuries occurred. Thus, the insurers
will argue that the claims against the NFL have not triggered their policies.
The NFL, on the other hand, likely will argue that the brain diseases suffered
by the players are progressive diseases that began with the first blow to
the manner in which the courts of the various states address similar interpretive issues can
vary widely from one state to the next.”).
20. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability
and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 469 (2006) (“New
York law is particularly popular for Bermuda insurers and others in the industry because
New York is viewed as a somewhat pro-insurer jurisdiction that has a few particularly
favorable rules aiding insurers.”).
21. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.03[B].
22. See, e.g., id. § 2.01 (“To ‘trigger’ a policy, a specified event— e.g., bodily injury
or property damage—must take place during the policy period.”); 7 STEVEN PLITT ET AL.,
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:23 (June 2016 Update) (“Under a liability policy providing
coverage for each ‘accident’ or each ‘occurrence’ during the policy period, a risk insured
against by the policy must occur during the policy period in order for coverage to be
triggered.” (citing Mangerchine v. Reaves, 63 So. 3d 1049, 1054 (La. Ct. App. 2011))); Gregory
A. Goodman, Insurance Triggers as Judicial Gatekeepers in Toxic Mold Litigation, 57
VAND. L. REV. 241, 245 (2004) (“The trigger of coverage is a legal test applied by courts
to determine which policy has coverage obligations under a claim brought by the policy
holder.” (citing MITCHELL L. LATHROP, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
§ 1.16 (2002))).
23. PLITT ET AL., supra note 22.
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each player’s head and will progress until the player ultimately dies.
Consequently, each player’s claim triggers every policy year on the risk
from the time the player entered the NFL until a brain disease manifested
or the player died.
“Allocation” is the insurance term for determining how much each insurer
must pay when multiple policies are triggered with respect to the same
claim.24 Many of the insurers likely will argue for “pro rata” allocation,
which evenly divides the liability associated with a claim over the entire
time period the injury occurred.25 On the other hand, the NFL—and perhaps
some higher level excess insurers—likely will argue for “all sums” allocation,
which allows the policyholder to pick which policy year(s), of multiple policy
years that a claim triggers, should pay.26 Under “all sums” allocation, the
policyholder can slot all of its liabilities into one or more policy years, and
thus avoid paying numerous deductibles or self-insured retentions (SIRS).27
The insurers required to pay under “all sums” allocation can then seek
contribution from the insurers in other triggered policy years.28
The “number of occurrences” issue is the question of how many players’
claims should be lumped together for deductibles/SIRs and limits of liability
purposes. The issue’s resolution can have enormous financial implications.29
24. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.01 (“Policyholder-insurer disputes
over the proper trigger of coverage . . . are invariably followed by disputes over the ‘scope’
of coverage afforded by each triggered policy in effect during the injury process. This is
sometimes also referred to as the allocation issue.” (citation omitted)); 15 PLITT ET AL.,
supra note 22, § 220:25 (“Many environmental damage and toxic exposure cases, for
example, involve injuries that occur over a number of years. Because in these types of
cases it is virtually impossible to allocate to each policy the liability for injuries occurring
only within its policy period, the courts are left with the nettlesome problem of how to
allocate damages among the policies.” (citing Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating
Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257,
258 (1997))); Michael G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive
Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 257–58 (1997) (“Progressive injuries frequently
occur over time periods in which a liable party had insurance coverage under several different
insurance policies, often provided by a number of insurance companies. In most of these
cases, it is both scientifically and administratively impossible to allocate to each policy the
liability for injuries occurring only within its policy period. When it is impossible to determine
the proportion of damage that occurred within each period, the law must allocate damages
among the policies.” (first citing Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d
878, 881 (Cal. 1995); then citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF TOXIC TORT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES
120–23 (1991))).
25. KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, §§ 3.01, 3.01[B][2].
26. Id.
27. See KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.01[C].
28. Id. §§ 3.01, 3.02.
29. Id. § 3.03[B] (“Depending on a policy’s per occurrence and aggregate limits
and the amount of any applicable self-insurance features, the number of occurrences determination
is tantamount to determining the extent of the policyholder’s recovery.”); PLITT ET AL., supra
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It generally is in the insurers’ financial interest to argue for multiple
occurrences if the policies contain significant deductibles/SIRs or if the
policies contain aggregate limits, which policies today typically do. Older
CGL policies, on the other hand, do not necessarily contain aggregate
limits.30 Conversely, if the NFL’s policies have high deductibles/SIRs, then
the NFL likely will argue that all of the players’ claims arise from a single
occurrence.
Finally, the insurers likely will argue that they have no liability for any of
the NFL’s defense or indemnity costs due to the “expected or intended”
exclusion which typically is present in standard form CGL policies.31 As
a general matter, insurance is intended to cover only fortuitous injuries.32
Consequently, CGL policies expressly exclude coverage for any injuries
or damages expected or intended by the policyholder.33 Due to this exclusion,
the insurers likely will argue that prior to purchasing their policies the
NFL knew that repetitive blows to the head can lead to long-term brain
injuries, yet the NFL did little, if anything, to warn against or prevent such
injuries to NFL players. Thus, the NFL intended, or at least expected, the
injuries for which it is now liable and the insurers should not be required
to pay for these non-fortuitous liabilities. The NFL undoubtedly will dispute
such an assertion and the applicability of the exclusion.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses delayed manifestation
brain diseases caused by repeated blows to the head and the NFL players’
class action litigation. Part II sets forth the relevant insurance policy
provisions at the center of the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation. Part
III addresses the differences between the insurance laws of New York and
Pennsylvania regarding the principal issues identified above that likely
will dictate the outcome of the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation and
the potentially divergent outcomes under the respective states’ laws.

note 22, § 172:12 (“[W]here the liability policy defines ‘occurrence’ as a series of related
incidents, acts, or omissions resulting in injury, there will be a single ‘occurrence’ even though
there have been multiple causative acts, if the acts are causally related to each other as well
as to the final result.” (footnote omitted)).
30. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.03[A][3].
31. See, e.g., DONALD S. MALECKI, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
GUIDE, app. J § I.2.a, at 571 (11th ed. 2015).
32. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 19, at 413 (citing Waller v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 626 (Cal. 1995)); 7 PLITT ET AL., supra note 22, § 102:7 (“Implicit
in the concept of insurance is that the loss occur as a result of an event that is fortuitous
rather than planned, intended, or anticipated.” (footnote omitted)).
33. See, e.g., MALECKI, supra note 31.
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A NEW TYPE OF LONG-TAIL INSURANCE CLAIM: BRAIN DISEASES
CAUSED BY REPEATED BLOWS TO THE HEAD
A. The Cumulative Impact of Repeated Blows to the Head

Today, it generally is accepted that repeated blows to a person’s head
cumulatively can cause long-term brain diseases that may not manifest for
many years.34 Dr. Bennet Omalu, a Nigerian forensic pathologist, recently
named one type of these long term brain injuries Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy (CTE) after he discovered an abnormal buildup of Tau
Protein in Iron Mike’s brain during an autopsy.35 According to Boston
University’s CTE Center, what we now call “CTE has been known to affect
boxers since the 1920s.”36 With boxers, it was referred to as “dementia
pugilistica” or “punch drunk” syndrome.37 In a person with CTE, the “brain
degeneration [causes] . . . memory loss, confusion, impaired judgment, impulse
control problems, aggression, depression, and, eventually, progressive
dementia.”38 Other brain function problems that can result from repeated
blows to the head include: “Alzheimer’s Disease, dementia, depression,
deficits in cognitive functioning, reduced processing speed, attention and
reasoning impairment, loss of memory, sleeplessness, mood swings, and
personality changes.”39 One of the revelations regarding CTE that has brought
the disease to the forefront of public consciousness and concern is the theory
that sub-concussive blows can cause CTE, which means a person does not
have to be repeatedly knocked out or suffer repeated concussions in order
to get the disease.40 To the contrary, according to the theory, repetitive,
smaller blows can cause these debilitating brain diseases.41
34. See What is CTE?, B.U. CTE CENTER, http://www.bu.edu/cte/about/what-is-cte/
[https://perma.cc/43WL-P8T8] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
35. See, e.g., Laskas, supra note 1.
36. What is CTE?, supra note 34; see also Turner v. NFL (In re Nat’l Football League
Players Concussion Injury Litig.), 307 F.R.D. 351, 398 n.50 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 821
F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016).
37. See What is CTE?, supra note 34.
38. What is CTE?, supra note 34; see also Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 362.
39. Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 362.
40. See, e.g., Rick Maese, Repeated Hits to the Head More Significant than Concussions,
New Study Suggests, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
redskins/repeated-hits-to-head-more-significant-than-concussions-new-study-suggests/2016/
03/31/58dd9c6c-f750-11e5-9804-537defcc3cf6_story.html; Maxwell Strachan, Six Sentences
that Every Parent of a Football Player Should Read, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2015,
1:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/football-child-subconcussive-hits_us_5644d
543e4b045bf3dee2490 [https://perma.cc/EEV8-KYQY].
41. For a full discussion of the theory and the science underlying it, see Ann McKee
et al., The Spectrum of Disease in Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 136 BRAIN 43 (2013),
and Robert Stern et al., Clinical Presentation of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 81
NEUROLOGY 1122 (2013).
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B. The Players’ Class Actions Against the NFL
On July 19, 2011, seventy-three former NFL players sued the NFL, a
league that generates approximately $10 billion in annual revenues,42 in
state court in California.43 The complaint contained both negligence and
fraud counts.44 In essence, the players alleged that the NFL negligently
failed to protect players from the risk of long-term brain injuries due to
concussions and sub-concussive blows to the head and fraudulently
concealed such risks from the players.45 More specifically, the players
alleged that the NFL “fostered a culture surrounding football that glorified
violence and a gladiator mentality, encouraging NFL players to play despite
head injuries.”46 Further, the players alleged that the NFL created a committee
in 1994 to study the effects of concussive and sub-concussive injuries on
the players and then “obfuscated the connection between NFL Football
and long-term brain injury, despite knowing ‘for decades’ that such a
connection exists.”47 The players also alleged that the NFL misrepresented
to its players, the public, and Congress that “‘there was no scientifically
proven link between repetitive traumatic head impacts and later-in-life
cognitive/brain injury.’”48
A few weeks after the NFL players filed their initial lawsuit, they filed
two other similar lawsuits, one in California state court and one in federal
court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.49 The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania consolidated the actions, and former players eventually filed
300 substantially similar lawsuits against the NFL.50
C. The Settlement of the NFL Players’ Class Actions Against the NFL
On August 29, 2013, the players and the NFL reached a tentative settlement
that included a $765 million fund for medical exams and to provide
compensation for player injuries, but the federal district court declined to

42. Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 421.
43. See id. at 361, 421.
44. See id. at 362; Jay Barry Harris, We’ve Only Just Begun: Determining Who Pays
After the Approval Of The NFL Concussion Settlement, 83 DEF. COUNS. J. 156, 157 (2016).
45. See Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 362.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 361.
50. Id.
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approve the settlement primarily due to concerns that the players would
exhaust the funds prior to the expiration of the sixty-five year life of the
settlement.51 Five months later, the parties reached a new settlement, which
the federal district court approved.52 The settlement covers approximately
21,000 NFL players who retired before July 7, 2014, with only a total of 202
players opting out of the settlement.53
Under the approved settlement, there is no cap on the funds used to
compensate injured players and projections indicate that the settlement
will compensate players in the amount of approximately $1 billion.54 The
maximum player compensation for the various types of brain diseases
under the settlement is as follows:
Maximum
Qualifying Diagnosis
Award
$1.5 Million
Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment
Level 2 Neurocognitive Impairment
$3 Million
Parkinson’s Disease
$3.5 Million
Alzheimer’s Disease
$3.5 Million
Death with CTE
$4 Million
ALS
$5 Million55
The settlement agreement defines Levels 1.5 and 2 Neurocognitive
Impairment and they generally require a decline in cognitive function and
a loss of functional capabilities such as an inability to hold a job or do
household chores.56 Parkinson’s disease and ALS both cause debilitating
muscular and cognitive impairment including tremors, rigidity, and gait
disorders.57 ALS sufferers undergo a rapid and sweeping degeneration of
the entire neuromuscular system such that the person eventually requires
twenty-four hour medical care with a ventilator and feeding tube.58
On April 18, 2016, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval
of the settlement.59

51. Id. at 364.
52. Id.
53. See In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410,
425 (3d Cir. 2016).
54. See Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 364; In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion
Injury Litig., 821 F.3d at 447.
55. See Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 366.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 406.
58. Id.
59. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d at 411.
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II. THE NFL’S INSURANCE PROGRAM AND THE RELEVANT
INSURANCE POLICY LANGUAGE
Historically, many corporate policyholders have purchased CGL insurance
annually to create a seamless insurance program that will cover losses that
span multiple policy periods. Such programs typically have multiple layers
of coverage with primary insurance at the lowest level and excess insurance
above the primary insurance, with the total limits of insurance in each policy
year increasing as time moves forward.60 The policies in the various policy
years typically contain the same or similar language because the Insurance
Services Office, Inc. (ISO) drafts standard form CGL policies used by most
insurers.61 The NFL’s insurance program appears to fit this description and it
appears that the NFL has hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars
of coverage when the limits of the policies in its insurance program for
each of the forty-four years of its insurance program are added together.62
A graphic depiction of a typical insurance program of a corporate policyholder
appears in Figure A:

60. See infra Figure A.
61. ISO is an influential organization within the insurance industry that provides a
variety of services to many insurers. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979
So. 2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007). One of ISO’s primary functions is to draft policy forms
it then submits to state insurance regulators for approval. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (citation omitted). As a provider of services to
approximately 1,400 property and casualty insurers, ISO “is the almost exclusive source
of support services in this country for CGL insurance.” Id. As a result, “most CGL insurance
written in the United States is written on [ISO] forms.” Id. (citation omitted).
62. See, e.g., Nat’l Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d
318, 323 (2013); Affidavit of Anastasia Donias at Ex. 1, Alterra Am. Ins. v. Nat’l Football
League, No. 652813/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2012), ECF No. 68 (showing Alterra’s
policy provides $25 million in coverage to the NFL excess of $50 million in underlying
coverage).

911

FRENCH (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2018 3:07 PM

FIGURE A: TYPICAL INSURANCE PROGRAM OF A CORPORATE
POLICYHOLDER

Under the hypothetical insurance program reflected in Figure A, if a
covered liability in the amount of $20 million triggered only the 1971
policy year, then Insurer H would pay the first $5 million, Insurer C would
pay the next $5 million, Insurer G would pay the next $5 million, and Insurer
E would pay the final $5 million. In long-tail claims such as concussionrelated brain disease cases where the time period in which the injuries
were caused implicates multiple policy years and the amounts of the
liabilities implicate multiple layers of coverage, the determination of each
insurer’s liability can become quite complex. For example, assume that
the NFL’s covered liability for a group of players totals $25 million and
it has been determined that the blows to the players’ heads that gave rise
to the liability began in 1968 and ended in 1975, and that the players’ brain
diseases began to manifest in 1980. What is Insurer B’s coverage obligation?
As one might suspect, answering that question is a difficult task that turns
on the applicable law and policy language. The policy provisions relevant
to the analysis are discussed below.
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A. The Insuring Agreement
Under ISO’s 2007 standard form CGL policy, for example, the basic
insuring agreement language—the insurer’s promise to the policyholder—
provides as follows:
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” . . . to which this
insurance applies. . . .
b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” . . . only if:
(1) The “bodily injury” . . . is caused by an “occurrence” that takes
place in the “coverage territory;” [and]
(2) The “bodily injury” occurs during the policy period . . .63
In short, the policy covers the amount that the NFL must pay due to a “bodily
injury” during the policy period caused by an “occurrence.”
B. The Definition of “Bodily Injury”
“Bodily Injury” is defined as: “bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained
by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any time.”64
There should be no debate that the NFL players’ brain diseases for which
they have sued the NFL are bodily injuries.
C. The Definition of “Occurrence”
Prior to 1986, ISO’s standard form CGL policies defined “occurrence”
as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.”65 Beginning in 1986, and
continuing today, ISO’s standard form CGL policy defined “occurrence” as
“an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially

63. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY OCCURRENCE FORM
(2007), reprinted in MALECKI, supra note 31, app. J §§ I(1)(a), I(b)(1), at 570.
64. Id. app. J § V.3, at 582.
65. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY OCCURRENCE FORM
(1973), reprinted in MALECKI, supra note 31, app. A, at 363.
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the same general harmful conditions.”66 Under both definitions, to determine
whether there is a covered occurrence, the analysis focuses on whether an
act or omission unexpectedly caused a bodily injury during the policy
period. In short, did a bodily injury occur during the policy period as a
result of an accident?
D. The “Expected or Intended” Exclusion
As many courts already treated the “expected or intended” language in
the definition of an “occurrence” as an exclusion,67 in 1986 ISO moved
the expected or intended language to the exclusions section of CGL policies:
“This insurance does not apply to . . . ‘[b]odily injury’ . . . expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insured . . . .”68 This move did not, however,
change the analysis of whether there has been a covered occurrence. The
question is still whether the policyholder did something or failed to do
something that resulted in a bodily injury during the policy period that the
policyholder did not expect or intend.69
66. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY OCCURRENCE FORM
(1986), reprinted in MALECKI, supra note 31, app. B, § V(9), at 373; INS. SERVS. OFFICE,
INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY OCCURRENCE FORM (2007), reprinted in MALECKI,
supra note 31, app. J § V(9), at 583.
67. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 4:88-CV-124, 1994 WL
1029337, at *9 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 1994) (“[A]lthough the neither expected nor intended
language appears in the occurrence clause, it essentially operates as an exclusion.”);
Clemco Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 820–21 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(determining that the “expected or intended” language is an exclusionary clause, and thus
requires a narrow interpretation to provide the insured the greatest protection (citing White
v. Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 313 (Cal. 1985))); Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kovash, 452 N.W.2d 307, 311 n.3 (N.D. 1990) (“A determination of coverage
under the ‘expected or intended’ language in the definition of an occurrence generally
involves the same determination as coverage under an exclusion for intentional acts.” (citing
James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability
Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31
A.L.R.4th 957, 971 (1984))).
68. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY OCCURRENCE FORM (2007), supra note 63,
app. B § (2)(a), at 467; COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY OCCURRENCE FORM (1986),
supra note 66, app. B § (2)(a), at 269.
69. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 6.03[B][1] (“Most jurisdictions follow
the rule that only expected or intended injury, as opposed to expected or intended acts, can
preclude coverage.” (citations omitted)); see also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979
So. 2d 871, 883 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]hese policies provide coverage not only for ‘accidental events,’
but also injuries or damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”
(citation omitted)); Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 745 S.E.2d 508, 520 (W. Va. 2013)
(“In determining whether under a liability insurance policy an occurrence was or was not
an ‘accident’—or was or was not deliberate, intentional, expected, desired, or foreseen—
primary consideration, relevance, and weight should ordinarily be given to the perspective
or standpoint of the insured whose coverage under the policy is at issue.” (quoting Columbia
Cas. Co. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 617 S.E.2d 797, 797 (W. Va. 2005))).
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III. THE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES IN THE NFL V. INSURANCE INDUSTRY
LITIGATION UNDER COMPETING STATE LAWS REGARDING
FIVE OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES
A. Choice of Law
State law generally governs insurance disputes, and, as is the case in
many complex insurance coverage disputes, the outcome of the NFL v.
Insurance Industry litigation will be heavily dictated by which state’s law
is applied because insurance law varies considerably from state to state.70
Indeed, the choice-of-law battle could be the most important battle in the
case.71
CGL policies typically do not contain a choice-of-law provision that
specifies which state’s laws will apply, so the court must rely upon state
choice-of-law rules to make this critical decision.72 In the absence of a
contractual mandate, courts typically only apply the law of a single state
even if the case involves multiple parties from different states and the
outcome of the litigation will impact the interests of multiple states.73 Courts
70. See KALIS ET AL., supra note 19; see also 2 PLITT ET AL., supra note 22, § 24:1
(“In theory, the laws of two states cannot control the interpretation of a contract of insurance,
and the choice of which jurisdiction’s law will govern can have serious consequences for
an insurance dispute.”).
71. See, e.g., Peter J. Kalis, James R. Segerdahl & John T. Waldron, The Choiceof-Law Dispute in Comprehensive Environmental Coverage Litigation: Has Help Arrived
from the American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project?, 54 LA. L. REV. 925, 933
(1994) (“The patchwork of state law that has evolved over the past decade or so has raised
dramatically the profile of the choice-of-law issue in [complex] environmental coverage
disputes. The resolution of this issue can be dispositive of whether a claim is covered, or,
at a minimum, can substantially affect the value of the claim.”); Larry Kramer, Choice of
Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 553–54 (1996) (“Conflicts scholars
don’t fight bitterly about the differences among approaches [to determining choice law]
because we disagree about their aesthetic qualities. We fight because the differences matter
in terms of outcomes.”).
72. See, e.g., Kalis et al., supra note 71, at 927 (“No express direction on this point
is available by reference to the standard CGL policy form. The drafters’ failure to include
a choice-of-law provision is a key omission in the form resulting in contractual silence on
an issue that dramatically affects the rights of the parties to the contract. Moreover, the
omission renders virtually unattainable the goals of efficiency, predictability, and uniformity
inherent in the use of standardized forms.” (footnote omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989
U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 126 (arguing for a choice-of-law rule in mass tort cases under which
the law of a single state would apply (citing In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580
F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1984))); Kramer, supra note 71, at 547 (concluding there is
a consensus that “choice-of-law practices should yield in suits consolidating large numbers
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generally justify the application of a single state’s law as an approach that
promotes fairness, judicial economy, and consistency in the individual
claims’ outcomes.74
As the forum state, the New York state court judge adjudicating the NFL
v. Insurance Industry litigation will apply New York law to determine which
state’s law will govern the substantive legal issues.75 The traditional
approach to choice of law for contracts provides that either the law of the
place of contracting or the place of performance should apply to resolve
disputes under the contract at issue.76 In Auten v. Auten,77 the New York
Court of Appeals departed from the traditional approach, however, and
adopted what is known as the “center of gravity” or the “significant contacts”
approach. The “center of gravity” approach gives “the place ‘having the most
interest in the problem’ paramount control over the legal issues arising out
of a particular factual context.”78 Under this approach, courts analyze the
relative contacts the states have with the dispute to determine which state
has the most “significant contacts” that justifies applying that state’s law.79
Over time, the “center of gravity” approach adopted in New York has been
shaped and influenced by the factors considered under the modern choice-

of claims . . . [to] a single law in [complex litigation],” even though a primary argument
of his paper is that courts and commentators generally are wrong that only a single state’s
law should apply in such cases); Thomas M. Reavley & Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old
Rule for New Reasons: Place of Injury As A Federal Solution to Choice of Law in SingleAccident Mass-Tort Cases, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (1992) (“We think that fairness demands
that parties to cases concerning identical facts be treated equally under the law . . . .”).
74. Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 73; see also Arthur R. Miller & David Crump,
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1986) (explaining that the application of multiple states’
laws in class actions by a single judge is too difficult because a “nationwide class action
may present an even greater problem because of the sheer burden of organizing and
following fifty or more different bodies of complex substantive principles”).
75. See, e.g., Certified Multi-Media Sols., Ltd. v. Preferred Contractors Ins. Co.
Risk Retention Grp., 150 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that when New
York is the forum state in which the case will be decided, the court applies New York
choice-of-law principles); MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 965
N.Y.S.2d 284, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“Since New York is the forum state, New York
choice of law rules are applicable.” (citing Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001,
1002 (N.Y. 1994))); Curbow Family LLC v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, 950 N.Y.S.2d
845, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (stating that New York choice-of-law principles are
determinative because New York is the forum state).
76. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 358 (AM. LAW INST.
1934).
77. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101–02 (N.Y. 1954) (citing Rubin v. Irving Trust
Co., 113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (N.Y. 1953)).
78. Id. at 102 (citing Sanford H. Kadish, Labor Arbitration and the Law in Utah, 3
UTAH L. REV. 490, 498–99 (1953)).
79. Id.
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of-law approaches reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Law.80
The Second Restatement offers seven general principles “relevant to the
choice of applicable rule of law,” which include considerations such as
the “policies of . . . interested states,” “the protection of justified expectations,”
and “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.”81 With respect to
contracts in particular, if the contract does not specify which state’s laws
govern, there are five factors to consider when analyzing the seven general
overriding principles: “[1] the place of contracting, [2] the place of negotiation
of the contract, [3] the place of performance, [4] the location of the subject
matter of the contract, and [5] the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties.”82 Thus, when determining
questions of choice of law, New York courts typically analyze the significant
contacts of the relative states and parties involved in light of these factors.83
In addition to the general factors discussed above, the Second Restatement
also contains provisions to determine choice of law in disputes that involve
liability policies.84 Specifically, it provides the governing law should be:
[T]he local law of the state which the parties understood was to be the principal
location of the insured risk during the term of the policy, unless with respect to
the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.85

Thus, for simple insurance disputes, courts often presume that the principal
place of the insured risk has the most “significant relationship” and that
state’s law typically applies to the dispute. A showing that another state has
a more significant relationship, however, can defeat that presumption and
lead to another state’s law being applied.
The approach New York courts use to determine the law applicable to
insurance disputes where the insured risk is spread across multiple states,

80. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Shearson Lehamn Hutton, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1065,
1068 (N.Y. 1994) (using the factors provided in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Law to determine which state has the most significant contacts).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
82. Id. § 188.
83. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co., 642 N.E.2d at 1068; Jimenez v. Monadnock Constr.,
Inc., 970 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580 (App. Div. 2013).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 193.
85. Id.
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however, is different and more complex86 because the Second Restatement
recognizes that no single location of the insured risk exists if the insured risk
spreads across multiple states.87 The goal of the analysis in such circumstances
is to use the law of the state with the most at stake in the litigation, as
opposed to the state that simply has the most contacts associated with the
placement of the policies.88 In short, the court should attempt to determine
which state has the most at stake in the resolution of the case and then
apply that state’s law.
1. The Argument for New York Law
In 2007, the New York Court of Appeals had an opportunity to address
choice of law in an insurance dispute that involved insured interests
throughout the country in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Foster
Wheeler Corp.89 In Foster Wheeler, the court needed to determine which
policies were triggered and then apportion the policyholder’s liabilities
associated with a large number of asbestos-related bodily injury claims
asserted throughout the country against the policyholder and one of its
subsidiaries.90 The court considered whether to apply New York law, the
state in which numerous brokers who were involved with the placement
of the policies were located, or New Jersey law, the state in which the
policyholder’s principal place of business was located.91
In its analysis, the court began with a recitation of New York’s general
choice-of-law principles, as discussed above, but encountered some difficulty
when trying to determine the location of the insured risk.92 The court stated,
“the location-of-the-risk rule obviously cannot be applied without modification
in the event the insurance policies in question cover risks that are spread
through multiple states.”93 The policyholder’s risks were “widely dispersed”
and really “nationwide or global in scope.”94 That meant that the insured risk

86. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 822
N.Y.S.2d 30, 37 (App. Div. 2006), aff’d, 876 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 2007).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 193 cmt. b.
88. Foster Wheeler, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (“[T]he choice-of-law analysis is not ‘a
mindless scavenger hunt to see which state can be found to have more contacts, but rather . . .
an effort to detect and analyze what interest the competing states have in enforcing their
respective rules.’” (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Schuster Films, Inc., 811 F. Supp.
978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1993))).
89. Id. at 31.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 36–38.
92. Id. at 33–34 (quoting, in part, Zurich Ins. Co. v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 642
N.E. 1065, 1068–69 (N.Y. 1994).
93. Id. at 33.
94. Id.
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existed in no single state. Thus, the court had to turn to “broader choiceof-law principles.”95
In its analysis, the court cited Auten for the general proposition that the
“center of gravity” approach aims to allow courts to apply the law of the
state having the most paramount interest in the dispute.96 To achieve that
goal, the court considered the relative “governmental interests implicated
by an insured’s claim against an insurer of risks located in multiple states,”
which the court concluded “weigh in favor of applying the law of the
insured’s domicile . . . .”97 In addition, the court stated that the overall goal
of “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result” set forth in the Second
Restatement98 also supported the application of the law of the policyholder’s
domicile.99 The court reasoned that the parties knew the location of the
policyholder’s domicile at the time of contracting and consequently, applying
the law of that state best reflected the parties’ expectations.100
Ultimately, the court in Foster Wheeler held that “where it is necessary
to determine the law governing a liability insurance policy covering risks
in multiple states, the state of the insured’s domicile should be regarded
as the proxy for the principal location of the insured risk.”101 In other words,
when determining the law that applies to insurance policies that cover
risks in multiple states, the court still treated the policyholder’s domicile
as the place of the insured risk despite other states’ numerous contacts and
interests in the dispute.
New York courts have applied the Foster Wheeler holding in other cases
so the decision likely will strongly influence the judge tasked with determining
the law applicable to resolving the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation.102

95. Id. at 34.
96. Id. (citing Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954)).
97. Id. The governmental interests identified by the court were:
(1) regulating conduct with respect to insured risks within the state’s borders;
(2) assuring that the state’s domiciliaries are fairly treated by their insurers; (3)
assuring that insurance is available to the state’s domiciliaries from companies
located both within and without the state; and (4) regulating the conduct of insurance
companies doing business within the state’s borders.
Id.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
99. Foster Wheeler, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
100. Id. at 34–35.
101. Id. at 35.
102. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Di Sicurata, 875 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (App. Div.
2009) (citing Foster Wheeler, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 35); Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nat’l
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Because the NFL’s principal place of business is New York, this fact likely
will weigh heavily in favor of applying New York law.103 And, of course,
many of the brokers involved in the placement of the policies, some of the
insurers, and some of the underlying NFL player class members are also
located in New York.104 Consequently, under Foster Wheeler, New York
law arguably should apply in the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation.105
2. The Argument for the Law of Another State Such as Pennsylvania
Despite Foster Wheeler, one can also strongly argue that the law of a state
or states other than New York should apply in the NFL v. Insurance Industry
litigation. As discussed above, Foster Wheeler calls for a choice-of-law
analysis under the general framework of the “center of gravity” or “significant
contacts” approach formulated in the Second Restatement. Thus, when
arguing choice of law, the parties can still argue that consideration of
principles from the Second Restatement other than just the policyholder’s
domicile better reflect the goal of the “significant contacts” approach and
should dictate the applicable choice of law. With that in mind, one can also
argue to apply other state’s laws, such as Pennsylvania, the state that handled
the underlying NFL players’ litigation against the NFL.
Foster Wheeler held that, in cases where the insured risk spreads across
multiple states, the court will deem the “principal location of the insured risk,”
as provided in Second Restatement Section 193, as policyholder’s domicile.106
That determination, however, is only the first step in the choice-of-law
analysis. Section 193 then provides that if a state other than the principal
location of the insured risk “has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in § 6 to the transaction,” then that state’s law should
apply.107 Thus, courts can and should still entertain a choice-of-law analysis
grounded in the general principles provided in Section 6 of the Second
Restatement.108

Union Fire Ins. Co., 888 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Foster Wheeler, 822
N.Y.S.2d at 35).
103. See Nat’l Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318, 321
(Ct. App. 2013).
104. See id. at 322–23.
105. Foster Wheeler, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
106. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 193 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 193.
108. Interestingly, the court in Foster Wheeler also entertained such an analysis. The
court stated that “[Section 193] is the controlling factor in determining the law applicable
to a liability insurance policy, thereby obviating the need to consider [the] Restatement
factors [at Section Six].” Foster Wheeler, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 37. However, the court then
said that even considering all of those factors, it would reach the same conclusion. Id.
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Davis & Partners, LLC v. QBE Insurance Corp.109 provides a good
illustration of this point. In that case, the policyholder was a New Jersey
company.110 The underlying claim arose from an incident at a construction
site in New York.111 The outcome of the coverage case, which a New York
state court decided, would differ if the court applied New York versus New
Jersey law—the policyholder would lose under New York’s late notice law.112
In conducting its choice-of-law analysis, the trial court rejected the argument
that Foster Wheeler mandates that the law of the policyholder’s domicile
state controls where the insured risks span multiple states:
[T]here is no per se rule that where the policy insures risks in more than one state,
the place of the insured’s domicile must be applied [under Foster Wheeler].
Rather, the courts continue to apply the center of gravity test. Nor, contrary to
[the additional insured’s] contention, are the courts limited, in applying the center
of gravity test to consideration of the five factors enumerated in the Restatement
of Law—the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance,
the location of the subject matter, and the contracting parties’ domiciles. Rather,
the courts will also apply an interest analysis under which the respective governmental
interests of the competing jurisdictions are considered. Under the center of gravity
approach, while the Restatement factors are given “heavy weight,” “the spectrum of
significant contactsrather than a single possibly fortuitous eventmay be
considered. Critical to a sound analysis, however, is selecting the contacts that obtain
significance in the particular contract dispute.”
The center of gravity approach thus seeks to identify the law of the state with
the most significant relationship to the transaction and parties and to avoid inconsistent
results where claims are brought under the insurance policy in different states.
“[U]nderlying the rule that . . . the location of the insured risk carries little weight
in a choice-of-law analysis where the risk is scattered throughout two or more
states—is an understanding that, barring extraordinary circumstances, only one
state’s law should govern an insurance agreement.”113

The trial court nonetheless then held New Jersey law, the policyholder’s
domicile state, should apply and denied the insurer’s cross-motion for summary
judgment that was predicated on application of New York law.114
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the
policyholder because the intermediate appellate court ultimately held New
109. Davis & Partners, LLC v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 108041/10, 2013 WL 285577 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 979 N.Y.S.2d 311 (App. Div. 2014).
110. Id. at *3.
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id. at *3 (citing Argo Corp. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 827 N.E.2d 762, 763,
765 (N.Y. 2005)).
113. Id. at *4 (final alteration in original) (citations omitted).
114. Id. at *5, *8.
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York, not New Jersey, law should apply because of a New York choiceof-law provision in the policy and the fact that the incident giving rise to
the claim occurred in New York—the appellate court rejected the application
of the law of the policyholder’s domicile state.115 The intermediate appellate
court did not, however, take exception to the trial court’s point that Foster
Wheeler does not mandate a conclusion that the law of the policyholder’s
domicile state must apply whenever the insured risks span multiple states.116
To the contrary, the trial court correctly stated that New York courts remain
free to consider the general principles of the “center of gravity” approach
as a whole in deciding choice-of-law issues under New York law.117 Thus,
the NFL can argue that, pursuant to the principles stated in Second Restatement
Section 6, the law of another state besides New York, the NFL’s domicile
state, should control because another state has a more significant relationship
to the dispute than New York does.
Which, if any, state(s) has a more significant relationship to the dispute
than New York? The NFL presumably preferred California, as evidenced
by the fact it sued its insurers there, based upon: (1) the NFL’s marketing
department has prior history in the state between 1970 and 2005, (2)
approximately 12% of the former NFL players reside in California, (3) three
NFL teams are located in California, (4) many NFL football games have
been played in California, and (5) two of the insurers the NFL sued are located
in California.118 Unfortunately for the NFL, the California court in which the
NFL sued already has found these California contacts insufficient to even allow
the California court to proceed to hear the case when presented with a forum
non conveniens motion to stay in favor of the insurers’ New York coverage
cases.119 Consequently, if the NFL could not even convince a California
court to hear the case, then it seems unlikely that it will be able to convince
a New York court that California has the greatest stake in the dispute such
that California law should apply.
So, what state arguably has more contacts with the dispute than either
New York or California? Pennsylvania.

115. Davis & Partners, LLC v. QBE Ins. Corp., 979 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (App. Div.
2014).
116. See Davis & Partners, LLC, 979 N.Y.S.2d 311.
117. See id. at 313; see also Brief of Appellant at 22, Lapolla Indus., Inc. v. Aspen
Specialty Ins. Co., 566 Fed. Appx. 95 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4436-CV), 2014 WL 345193,
at *23 (“Despite the Foster Wheeler opinion . . . New York courts still consider all the
relevant factors rather than focusing exclusively on the insured’s domicile.”).
118. See Nat’l Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318,
321–22, 325, 326 (Ct. App. 2013).
119. Id. at 328–29, 348.
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Pennsylvania courts consolidated more than 300 NFL players’ lawsuits
for litigation.120 Pennsylvania courts certified the NFL players’ class.121
Pennsylvania courts handled the NFL players’ class action, and then they
vetted and approved the settlement.122 Pennsylvania courts expended their
time and resources on the NFL litigation.123 Many of the NFL players covered
by the settlement reside in Pennsylvania.124 Four of the insurers sued by the
NFL have their principle places of business in Pennsylvania and issued
dozens of the insurance policies at issue.125 Consequently, Pennsylvania has
a strong interest in ensuring that insurance money will satisfy the NFL’s
approximately $1 billion settlement obligation to former NFL players.126
In sum, the argument is that Pennsylvania, the state in which the
underlying litigation proceeded and was resolved, has more connection to
the dispute as a whole than New York does. New York is simply the NFL’s
and some insurers’ and brokers’ headquarters. Pennsylvania is the state
that did the heavy lifting related to litigating and resolving the underlying
dispute. Pennsylvania is the state in which the insurers’ liabilities were
established.

120. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D.
351, 361 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Numerous courts have held that the law of the state in which the underlying
claims were litigated should control the outcome of the insurance coverage litigation
because of that state’s significant interests in the outcome of the insurance dispute. See,
e.g., Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 668 F.3d 991, 1000–1002
(8th Cir. 2012) (finding that the law of the state in which the underlying litigation took
place was the correct choice of law because that state had the most significant relationship
to the dispute); Teti v. Huron Ins. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating
that the location of the underlying litigation was an important factor in deciding to apply
that state’s law); Soc’y of Mount Carmel v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 643 N.E. 2d 1280,
1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (concluding that California law had the most significant
relationship to the dispute in part because the underlying litigation was filed in California);
Kramer v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 854 A.2d 948, 960 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (considering
the fact that New Jersey was the state of the underlying litigation in concluding that New
Jersey law applied to the dispute); Portland Trailer & Equip., Inc. v. A-1 Freeman Moving
& Storage, Inc., 49 P.3d 803, 810 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (“Oklahoma has the more significant
relationship, because it is the forum in which the underlying litigation occurred.”).
124. See Plaintiffs’ Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint, In re Nat’l Football
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (No. 2:12-md
02323-AB).
125. See Nat’l Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318,
323–24 (Ct. App. 2013).
126. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text.
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B. “Trigger”
For a policyholder to obtain coverage under any particular insurance
policy, the policyholder must prove that it “triggered” the policythat an
injury occurred during the policy period that requires the policy to respond.127
In many situations the triggering event is an isolated and instantaneous
occurrence, such as a car accident where the injury and the injury-causing
event take place at the same time.128 In delayed-manifestation brain disease
cases, however, the timing of the occurrence that triggers coverage is not
as clear because repeated blows to the head over the course of many years
cause such diseases and the brain damage itself may not manifest for many
more years. In such cases, an issue necessarily arises regarding which
insurance policies in existence during the injury process are triggered and,
assuming that the other conditions of the policies are satisfied, must provide
coverage.
Courts across the country have adopted different approaches to determining
when bodily injuries arising from a long-term latent disease process trigger
coverage.129 Courts commonly use the following four trigger approaches:
(1) when the initial exposure to the harmful condition occurred (“initial

127. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, at § 2.01 (“Although the trigger issue
exists in connection with any liability insurance claim, in many instances, its resolution is
so obvious that it is scarcely considered. For instance, where a driver’s car collides with
another’s vehicle, and the driver is sued for damage to the vehicle, the triggering event under
an occurrence policy is the damage to the vehicle, and its timing is readily ascertained.”);
James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate over
the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 626 (1997) (explaining in the example
of a car accident, “[t]he usual approach is to treat the accident as having happened when
injury was sustained . . .”).
129. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance,
87 VA. L. REV. 85, 95–96 (2001) (discussing trigger in connection with the emergence of
long-tail claims); Mark W. Dykes, Occurrences, Accidents, and Expectations: A Primer
of These (and Some Other) Insurance-Law Concepts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 831, 838–40
(discussing the policy language and claims used to trigger coverage); Fischer, supra note
128, at 641–50 (discussing the most common approaches to trigger used by courts);
Goodman, supra note 22, at 245 (2004) (“In the broadest sense, courts group the available
trigger theories into the following four categories: the exposure theory; the manifestation
or first discovery theory; the triple trigger or continuous trigger theory; and the injury-in
fact theory.”); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk–Injury
Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1700–01 (2007) (distinguishing “exposure,” “injury-in
fact,” and “exposure in residence” triggers for progressive diseases); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1489, 1563–69 (2010) (discussing asbestos cases and the application of continuous trigger).

924

FRENCH (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 53: 901, 2016]

10/22/2018 3:07 PM

Concussion Liabilities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

exposure”);130 (2) when the disease manifested (“manifestation”);131 (3) when
the injury actually occurs (“injury in fact”);132 and (4) all of the three preceding
methods (“triple trigger” or “continuous trigger”).133
130. See, e.g., Cont’l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Phar. & Chem. Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1180, 1189
(8th Cir. 1987) (“Environmental damage occurs at the moment that hazardous wastes are
improperly released into the environment[,] and [the] liability policy in effect at the time
this damage is caused provides coverage.” (footnote omitted)), aff’d in part, 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Clemtex, Inc. v. Se. Fid. Ins. Co., 807 F.2d 1271, 1276 (5th Cir.
1987) (finding that tissue damage takes place upon initial inhalation of asbestos); Hancock
Labs., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he California Supreme
Court would adopt the exposure theory to determine when bodily injury occurs.”); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (endorsing exposure
theory where “it is impossible practically to determine the point at which the fibers actually
imbed themselves in the victim’s lungs . . . “); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins.
Co., No. C84-1224A, 1986 WL 191786, at *35 (N.D. Ohio May 22, 1986) (“[T]he trigger
of coverage is the exposure which causes personal injury regardless of the time of the
injury.” (footnote omitted)); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F.
Supp. 1230, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (“[E]ach insurer on the risk when a currently deceased
plaintiff was allegedly exposed is obligated to acknowledge coverage and to provide a
defense and possibly indemnification.”), aff’d, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified,
657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1075–77 (La. 1992)
(applying exposure trigger).
131. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 118
(D. Mass. 1981) (applying manifestation trigger), modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
132. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 166, 168–
69 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[C]overage for [products liability] is triggered at times of
actual injury [and] injury-in-fact can . . . include . . . the inevitable pre-disposition to
illness or disability . . . caused by [the exposure].” (citations omitted)); Abex Corp. v. Md.
Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he insurer’s obligation to indemnify . . .
arises when the asbestos causes real bodily injury during the policy period.”); New York
v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp. 99, 102 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that coverage
for property damage is triggered when property is “injured in fact”), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 1991); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Abbott
Labs., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D. Conn. 1986) (footnote omitted) (finding that liability
coverage is triggered by occurrence of an injury in fact during the policy period); Armstrong
World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 703 (Ct. App. 1996) (endorsing
an injury-in-fact analysis); Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Heath Comp. & Liab. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d
30, 34–35 (Del. 1994) (“A policy is activated by bodily injury or property damage that takes
place ‘during the policy period.’”).
133. See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir.
1985) (“We hold that exposure, exposure-in-residence, and manifestation all constitute
‘bodily injury’ within the meaning of the policies.”); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[E]ach insurer on the risk between the initial
exposure and the manifestation of disease is liable to [the insured] for indemnification and
defense costs.”) vacated 631 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1985); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sussex Cty., 831 F. Supp. 1111, 1124 (D. Del. 1993) (applying continuous trigger where
“it is impossible to identify a precise point in time when property damage occurs from the
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1. Trigger Under New York Law
New York courts have not completely settled the trigger issue, as the
only Court of Appeals decision to address the issue did so only tangentially.134
For the most part, however, the lower New York courts and the Second
Circuit generally utilize the injury-in-fact approach when resolving trigger
of coverage issues for long-tail bodily injury claims.135
Under the injury-in-fact approach, an actual injury or damage-producing
event triggers coverage.136 Under this theory, a real, but undiscovered injury
leaching of pollutants”), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994); Chem. Leaman Tank Lines,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1153 (D.N.J. 1993) (applying continuous
trigger theory for environmental claims (citing Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F.
Supp. 1334, 1344–46 (D.N.J. 1992))), aff’d in part & remanded, 89 F.3d 976 (3d Cir.
1996); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 881, 885 (N.D. W. Va.
1991) (applying New Jersey law that policies are triggered during the “continuous period
from exposure to the manifestation of damages” (quoting Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570
A.2d 443, 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990))), aff’d, 957 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1992);
Time Oil Co. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1400, 1417 (W.D. Wash. 1990)
(noting that Washington has adopted a continuous trigger theory); Montrose Chem. Corp.
of Ca. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 906 (Cal. 1995) (en banc) (applying “continuous
injury” trigger); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985) (adopting
continuous trigger because policyholder “could have reasonably formed an expectation
that it was purchasing insurance coverage for all future liability arising from the
manufacturing and selling of [a drug with harmful side effects]”), aff’d, 794 F.2d 710 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (N.J. 1994) (applying
continuous trigger to progressive injury or damage claims); J.H. Fr. Refractories Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993) (concluding that the policies of each insurer
that was on the risk during the development of an asbestosis-related disease are triggered).
134. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1993).
135. See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d 65, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted) (reciting unchallenged findings of the trial court that injury-in-fact
during the policy period triggers coverage, and, in asbestos-related injury context, injuryin-fact in the form of tissue damage occurs simultaneously or soon after asbestos inhalation
and thus multiple policies are likely triggered); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims
Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1194 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that under New York law,
coverage is based upon the occurrence of an injury-in-fact during the policy period),
modified, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996); Md. Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617 (2d
Cir. 1993) (affirming the rule that policy coverage is triggered at the time of the injury,
rather than at the time the injury was discovered in a case where the injury was sustained
but not discovered until nine years later); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Emp’rs Ins. Co. (Keasbey),
871 N.Y.S.2d 48, 65 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that injury-in-fact, not exposure, triggers
coverage); Cortland Pump & Equip. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635–36
(App. Div. 1993) (holding the CGL policy language requires application of the injury-in
fact standard and that the lower court erred in its application of a discovery standard); Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. TransCanada Energy USA Inc., 28 N.Y.S.3d 800, 808 (Sup. Ct.
2016) (concluding coverage does not depend on a temporal relationship with the causative
event, but rather, whether the specified injuries were sustained during the policy period
(citing Labate v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 799 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73 (App. Div. 2005))).
136. See Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1497
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984).
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can trigger coverage, if it can be proven in retrospect to have existed
during the policy period, regardless of when the injury manifests.137 After a
doctor has diagnosed the injury or illness, it may be inferred, from the nature
of the gestation period and from the stage of the illness, that the harm actually
began sometime earlier, thereby triggering coverage during an earlier policy
period.138
New York courts applying injury-in-fact trigger to long-tail bodily injury
claims require the policyholder to prove that an actual injury occurred during
the relevant policy periods in order to trigger coverage during those policy
periods.139 As one might suspect, plaintiffs can have difficulty proving an
injury occurred in any particular policy year when there are multiple injurycausing events over a period of years, but no actual injury or disease manifests
until years or decades later.140
Under an injury-in-fact trigger, the NFL will need to prove when the brain
disease for each former NFL player actually occurred.141 Until experts testify
and the other evidence is admitted, it currently is unknown exactly what the
NFL will prove. Based upon the existing literature, however, it appears that
the NFL should have experts who will testify that the brain disease process
for players who have been subjected to repeated blows to the head is an
ongoing, continuing process that begins with the first blow and continues
until the player dies.142 If the evidence proves this, then the NFL potentially

137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Some New York courts have deviated from an injury-in-fact trigger in cases
where the policy language differs from ISO’s standard form insuring agreement, discussed
in Part II.A. See, e.g., In re Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., 709 N.Y.S.2d 24, 32 (App. Div.
2000) [hereinafter LAQ] (finding the policy “language can only be reasonably interpreted
to obligate the insurer to indemnify if the injured individual was actually exposed by
inhalation, not when the disease manifests itself”) overruled by In re Liquidation of
Midland Ins. Co., 947 N.E.2d 1174, 1182 (N.Y. 2011); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 406 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding the policy was triggered
based upon when the drugs causing the bodily injury were taken rather than at the onset
of bodily injury, even though the drug exposure occurred before the policy period). In
Keasbey, the Appellate Division noted that its trigger analysis in LAQ was limited to the
policy language at issue there. 871 N.Y.S.2d at 60. The appellate court criticized the lower
court for relying on LAQwhere the injury-causing event, not the injury itself, triggered
coverageand ignoring the language in the policies at issue that provided the bodily injury
triggered coverage. See id. The court in Keasbey ultimately adhered to the injury-in-fact
trigger. Id. at 65.
141. See supra Part III.B.
142. See supra Part I.A.
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could trigger many years of coverage for each injured playerfrom the
time the player received his first blow to the head in the NFL—no later
than the first game for most players—until the player’s brain disease later
manifests. In such a circumstance, the medical science would dictate that
the injury-in-fact trigger yields the same result as continuous trigger with
respect to which policy years are triggered.
If the NFL proves the disease process occurs when the blows to the head
occur, for example, then the number of policy years triggered under an injuryin-fact trigger would be significantly less than under continuous trigger.
Ultimately, the determination of which policy years are triggered will be
a question of fact for the factfinder to determine.143
2. Trigger Under Pennsylvania Law
Pennsylvania is a continuous trigger state for delayed-manifestation bodily
injury claims.144 In J. H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted continuous trigger for asbestosrelated diseases. The court based its holding on the policy language discussed
in Part II of this Article and the evidence regarding the etiology and
pathogenesis of asbestos-related diseases, which indicated the disease process
begins with first exposure to asbestos fibers and continues until the person
dies.145
As discussed above, assuming the medical evidence regarding delayedmanifestation long-term brain diseases due to repeated blows to the head is
admissible, the disease process bears enough resemblance to asbestos-related
diseases that it can be expected that continuous trigger for such claims would
be applied under Pennsylvania law. Consequently, for each injured NFL
player, the policies on the risk from the time the player received his first
blow to the head in the NFL until the player’s brain disease manifests would
be triggered. If the medical evidence supports such a conclusion, then the

143. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178,
1193 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The jury and bench trials had
to determine, among other things, when . . . in light of the medical evidence presented, injury
took place with respect to the asbestos-induced bodily injury . . . .”).
144. See J. H. Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 1993)
(adopting continuous trigger for asbestos-related diseases based on the medical evidence
regarding the disease process).
145. Id. at 506. However, in the property damage context, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has declined to adopt a bright-line rule that would apply continuous trigger to all
cases involving continuous, progressive property damage over successive policy periods.
See Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. John, 106 A.3d 1, 17–24 (Pa. 2014) (distinguishing
J.H. France and instead adopting manifestation trigger for damage to a dairy herd and its
milk production).
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same policy years would be triggered under New York’s injury-in-fact trigger
and Pennsylvania’s continuous trigger approach.
A different result more favorable to the NFL could occur under a continuous
trigger approach, however, if it cannot precisely prove how or when the
brain disease process occurs because some injury essentially is assumed
to occur during each policy period under a continuous trigger approach.146
Thus, if the NFL cannot prove that actual injury to the player’s brain occurred
during each policy period because the medical evidence is insufficient to
prove that actual injury to the player’s brain occurred during each policy
period between the date of the player’s first blow to the head and the date
when brain disease manifests, as is required under an injury in fact trigger,
such proof would not be required under continuous trigger.
C. “Allocation”
Courts’ approaches to allocationthe amount of the policyholder’s liability
to be paid by each triggered policyalso vary by state.147 Because longtail claims often trigger numerous policy periods and policies, many courts,
based upon the “all sums” language in CGL policies discussed above in
Part II.A of this Article, which states the insurer agrees to pay “all sums”
for which the policyholder is liable,148 have held that the policyholder can
146. State v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 281 P.3d 1000, 1005 (Cal. 2012) (noting that for longtail claims, it is appropriate to use continuous trigger because “[i]t is often ‘virtually impossible’
for an insured to prove what specific damage occurred during each of the multiple consecutive
policy periods in a progressive property damage case” (quoting William R. Hickman &
Mary R. DeYoung, Allocation of Environmental Cleanup Liability Between Successive
Insurers, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 291, 292 (1990))).
147. See, e.g., Christopher R. Hermann et al., The Unanswered Question of Environmental
Insurance Allocation in Oregon Law, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1131, 1136–37 (2003)
(footnotes omitted) (discussing the allocation problem in the environmental insurance
context); Thomas M. Jones & Jon D. Hurwitz, An Introduction to Insurance Allocation
Issues in Multiple-Trigger Cases, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 37–50 (1999) (footnotes omitted)
(discussing the methods for allocating indemnification obligations and defense costs);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create
a Thicket of Potential Unfairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
769, 807–23 (1999). Notably, in “manifestation” trigger jurisdictions, the allocation issue
is straightforward because only a single policy year is triggered by each claim. See Nicolas
R. Andrea, Exposure, Manifestation of Loss, Injury-in-Fact, Continuous Trigger: The
Insurance Coverage Quagmire, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 813, 836–87 (1994). Thus, the loss does
not need to be allocated among multiple triggered policy years.
148. “All sums” allocation is also inaccurately referred to as “joint and several”
liability or allocation. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co.,
951 P.2d 250, 254 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (“[W]hen an insured sustains damages of a
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select which of the triggered policy years will cover the liability subject
only to the limits of coverage provided by the policies selected.149 The
other dominant allocation methodology used in many jurisdictions is pro
rata allocation, which divides the liability equally among the policy years
triggered.150

continuing nature, its insurers are jointly and severally liable.” (citing Gruol Constr. Co.
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427, 431 (Wash. 1974))). The reason it is inaccurate to call
it joint and several liability or allocation is because each insurer’s liability is capped at the
limits of coverage the insurer provided, unlike under joint and several liability whereby
the insurer would be liable for the entire liability regardless of the policy limits. See, e.g.,
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 690, 710 (Ct. App.
1996) (“In the present case, the trial court correctly explained that the doctrine of joint and
several liability has no application to the obligations of successive insurers of a single
policyholder. Nevertheless, the insurance companies insist that the trial court’s decision
on the scope of coverage imposes joint and several liability upon the insurers. It does not.
The trial court’s decision ensures that the policyholder is indemnified by one insurer for
the full extent of the loss up to the policy’s limits . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
149. See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir. 1985)
(“[T]here is no proration of losses under a policy once coverage is triggered.”); Keene
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Policyholders may “collect
from any insurer whose coverage is triggered, the full amount of indemnity that it is due,
subject only to the provisions in the policies that govern the allocation of liability when more
than one policy covers an injury”); Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 491 (Del.
2001) (finding “all sums” language in policy is inconsistent with pro rata allocation); J.H.
Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506–07 (Pa. 1993) (finding each insurer
that issued a CGL policy to manufacturer of asbestos-containing products liable for the
entire loss subject to policy limits); Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 951 P.2d at 254 (finding that “all
insurers on the risk during the time of ongoing damage have a joint and several obligation
to provide full coverage for all damages,” regardless of the amount that occurred during their
policy period (citing Gruol Constr. Co., Inc., 524 P.2d at 431)).
150. See, e.g., Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese v. Interstate Fire
& Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (5th Cir. 1994) (dividing liability for damages based
on each insurer’s share of coverage); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d
1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (requiring all insurers that provided coverage to an asbestos
manufacturer during periods of exposure to participate in defense and settlement on a
prorated basis); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225
(6th Cir. 1980) (holding each of manufacturer’s insurers which issued policies covering
various time periods liable for its pro rata share); N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co.
of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn. 1994) (en banc) (“[A]llocation of liability between
multiple insurers consecutively on risk for pollution damages should be proportionate to
damages which occurred during each policy period.”). New Jersey applies a variation of
pro rata allocation that divides the liability among the triggered insurance policies based upon
the percentage amount of the limits of each policy issued in relation to all of the insurance
triggered by the claim. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1124 (N.J.
1998) (allocating coverage among multiple liability insurers in proportion to the degree of
the risks transferred or retained during the years of exposure); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United
Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (N.J. 1994) superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30A
5 (West 2016), as recognized in Farmer Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N. J. Property-Liability
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 74 A.3d 860, 863 (N.J. 2013) (“[W]hen progressive indivisible injury or
damage results from exposure to injurious conditions for which civil liability may be imposed,
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1. Allocation Under New York Law
New York allocation law recently became unclear. Prior to 2016, New
York courts generally used pro rata allocation.151
In 2002, the Court of Appeals of New York addressed the allocation issue
in the environmental contamination case of Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.152 The court rejected the policyholder’s
preference for “all sums” allocation, determining instead that pro rata
allocation was the appropriate method for apportioning liability among
the insurers.153 While noting that different ways exist to prorate liability
among successive policies, the court employed the “time-on-the-risk” method,
thus prorating liability based upon the amount of time that the policy was
in effect in comparison to the overall duration of the damage.154
In 2013, the Court of Appeals of New York re-affirmed the use of pro
rata allocation in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Nat’l. Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh.155 The court noted that pro rata allocation is particularly
appropriate where it is difficult to tie specific injuries to particular policy
periods and the policies provide coverage for bodily injury only if the injury
“occurs during the policy period.”156
On May 3, 2016, however, the New York Court of Appeals decision in
In re Viking Pump created uncertainty in New York’s allocation law.157
In Viking Pump, two manufacturing companies sued some of their insurers
for coverage for asbestos-related liabilities.158 The policies contained standard
form insuring agreements covering “all sums” for which the policyholders
are liable for an injury or loss that occurs “during the policy period,” as
courts may reasonably treat the progressive injury or damage as an occurrence within each
of the years of a CGL policy.”).
151. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 991 N.E.2d 666,
676–77 (N.Y. 2013); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687,
695–96 (N.Y. 2002); Serio v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 759 N.Y.S.2d 110, 115–16 (App.
Div. 2003) (applying pro rata “time on the risk” analysis to case involving lead paint exposure);
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmington Cas. Co., 765 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (Sup. Ct. 2003)
(reaffirming Serio’s adoption of the time on the risk allocation analysis) (citations omitted).
152. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 774 N.E.2d 687.
153. Id. at 694.
154. Id. at 695.
155. Roman Catholic Diocese, 991 N.E.2d at 668.
156. Id. at 676–77 (assuming that if the plaintiff suffered “bodily injury” in each policy
year, it would be consistent to allocate liability across all implicated policies rather than
holding a single insurer liable for harm suffered in years covered by other successive policies).
157.
In re Viking Pump, Inc., 52 N.E.3d 1144 (N.Y. 2016).
158. Id.
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discussed in Part II of this Article.159 The policies also included “non-cumulation
clauses.” The majority of the policies contained a non-cumulation clause
that the insurers worded as follows:
If the same occurrence gives rise to personal injury, property damage or advertising
injury or damage which occurs partly before and partly within any annual period
of this policy, the each occurrence limit and the applicable aggregate limit or limits of
this policy shall be reduced by the amount of each payment made by [the insurer]
with respect to such occurrence, either under a previous policy or policies of which
this is a replacement, or under this policy with respect to previous annual periods
thereof.160

The remaining policies contained a non-cumulation clause that provided:
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole or in part
under any other excess Policy issued to the [insured] prior to the inception date
hereof[,] the limit of liability hereon . . . shall be reduced by any amounts due to
the [insured] on account of such loss under such prior insurance. . . . [I]n the event
that personal injury or property damage arising out of an occurrence covered
hereunder is continuing at the time of termination of this Policy the [insurer] will
continue to protect the [insured] for liability in respect of such personal injury or
property damage without payment of additional premium.161

Based on these non-cumulation clauses, the court rejected pro rata allocation
and adopted “all sums” allocation for policies that contain non-cumulation
clauses,162 which many CGL policies do.163 Although the language of the
non-cumulation clauses at issue was not identical, the court ruled as it did
because the very presence of the clauses in the policies is inconsistent with
pro rata allocation.164 Non-cumulation clauses “presuppose[] that two policies
may be called upon to indemnify the insured for the same loss or
occurrence.”165 Thus, the court explained that the presence of a non-cumulation
clause conflicts with the basic assumption underlying pro rata allocation—
that multiple policies cannot cover the same loss or occurrence.166 Noncumulation clauses, according to insurers themselves, aim to address situations
where multiple policies cover the same loss.167 In other words, if the court
used pro rata allocation despite the presence of non-cumulation clauses, then

159. Id. at 1147.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1147–48 (second alteration in original).
162. Id. at 1153.
163. See generally Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other
Insurance Clause” by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375 (2012) (discussing non-cumulation
clauses and courts’ interpretation of them).
164. In re Viking Pump, Inc., 52 N.E.3d at 1153.
165. Id. at 1153–54.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1154.
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the non-cumulation clauses would become meaningless surplusage.168 Because
the law favors contractual interpretations that give meaning to all of the
terms in a policy if it is reasonable to do so, the court concluded that pro
rata allocation does not apply to such policies.169
The Viking Pump decision does not overrule Con Edison’s general use
of pro rata allocation in New York.170 It does, however, make clear that Con
Edison does not create a “blanket rule” that any particular allocation approach
should be automatically used in long-tail claim cases regardless of other
provisions in the policies. Significantly, because prior to Viking Pump, most
courts applying New York law simply assumed that Con Edison required
pro rata allocation.171
Because neither party has disclosed whether any of the insurance policies
in the NFL’s insurance program have non-cumulation clauses, it is uncertain
whether “all sums” or pro rata allocation would apply to the NFL v. Insurance
Industry litigation if the trial court uses New York law. The application
of pro rata allocation could significantly impair the NFL’s ability to collect
100% reimbursement of its liabilities to former NFL players if its insurance
program has significant deductibles or SIRs, or if some insurers in the program
are insolvent. If courts use an “all sums” allocation, on the other hand, then
the NFL likely could find enough policy years to cover its liabilitiesexcept
for the amounts subject to applicable deductibles/SIRsbecause it appears
the NFL’s insurance program has hundreds of millions, if not billions, of
dollars of coverage when the annual limits of coverage are aggregated.172
2. Allocation Under Pennsylvania Law
In 1993, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted “all sums” allocation
in J. H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.173 J.H. France involved
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1153–54.
170. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 687,
694–96 (N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted).
171. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 704 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“We agree . . . that New York state court decisions and those prior decisions of this Court
endorsing the pro rata approach foreclose us from interpreting [the policy’s condition] as
imposing joint and several liability.”).
172. See, e.g., Affidavit of Anastasia Donias at Ex. 1, Alterra Am. Ins. v. Nat’l Football
League, No. 652813/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2012), ECF No. 68 (showing that one
of the NFL’s policies provides $25 million in coverage to the NFL excess of $50 million
in underlying coverage).
173. See J.H. Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993).
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insurance coverage for a manufacturer’s liability for asbestos liabilities.174
The policy language at issue was the standard form language discussed in
Part II of the Article.175 The intermediate appellate court had applied pro rata
allocation when apportioning the liabilities among the triggered policies.176
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, reasoning:
First, and most compelling, is the language of the policies themselves. Each insurer
obligated itself to “pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury to which this
insurance applies.” We have already ascertained that any stage of the development of
a claimant’s disease constitutes an injury “to which this insurance applies” under
each policy in effect during any part of the development of the disease. Under any
given policy, the insurer contracted to pay all sums which the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay, not merely some pro rata portion thereof. . . . There is
nothing in the policies that provides for a reduction of the insurer’s liability if an
injury occurs only in part during a policy period. As we interpret the policies, they
cover [the manufacturer’s] entire liability once they are triggered.177

Under “all sums” allocation, the insurers selected by the policyholder
to cover the loss can then seek contribution from other insurers whose policies
were triggered but not selected by the policyholder: “This conclusion does
not alter the rules of contribution or the provisions of ‘other insurance’ clauses
in the applicable policies. There is no bar against an insurer obtaining a share
of indemnification or defense costs from other insurers under ‘other insurance’
clauses or under the equitable doctrine of contribution.”178
As discussed above, in the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation, application
of the “all sums” allocation approach likely would give the NFL the greatest
recovery from its insurers. Due to equitable contribution and “other insurance”
clauses found in standard form CGL policies, however, the actual financial
consequences for the insurers might be the same under either pro rata allocation
or “all sums” allocation because the insurers’ liabilities to the NFL could be
re-apportioned among the insurers after the NFL has been paid in full.

174. Id. at 504.
175. Id. at 505.
176. Id. at 506.
177. Id. at 507–08 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 509; see also Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that under “all sums” allocation, an “other insurance” clause does
not prohibit the policyholder from selecting the policy to respond, but rather permits an
insurer to seek contribution from other insurers (citing J.H. Fr. Refractories Co., 626 A.2d
at 507)); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding the
insured can collect from any triggered insurer and liability is apportioned among all).
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D. “Number of Occurrences”
The number of occurrences issue is the question of how many claims
should be lumped together for purposes of the deductibles/SIRs and the
policies’ limits of liability.179 In simple cases such as a car accident, there
is only one occurrencethe car accident that causes bodily injuries, property
damage, or bothso the number of occurrences issue is not important. In
long-tail claims such as the NFL players’ delayed manifestation brain disease
claims, on the other hand, where the injured players were exposed to multiple
injury-causing events over a long period of time, determining the number
of occurrences could be a significant issue in determining the amount of
the NFL’s insurance recovery. In situations where a policyholder faces
multiple claimants/claims with large liabilities associated with each claim and
the available insurance has high per occurrence limits with low deductibles/
SIRs, the policyholder often prefers that each claim be treated as a separate
occurrence to increase the amount of its recovery.180 Conversely, if the
applicable insurance has high deductibles/SIRs and the value of each claim
separately is relatively small, then the policyholder may prefer to lump all
of the claims together as a single occurrence to minimize the number of
deductibles/SIRs it must satisfy.181 And, of course, the insurers will take the
opposite view depending upon which approach is more favorable to them.
Consequently, policyholders and insurers often disagree about the method
to determine the number of occurrences.
Courts typically apply one of two competing approaches in determining
the number of occurrences: the “cause” test or the “effects” test.182 The cause
179. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.03[B].
180. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 84-3985, 1988
WL 5302, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1988) (explaining that the policyholder was sued by
thousands of asbestos claimants and would be limited to only $10,000,000 in recovery if
all of the claims were treated as a single occurrence but would recover $60,000,000 if they
were treated as separate occurrences).
181. See, e.g., Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1517
(D.D.C. 1984) (stating that the policyholder argued for a single occurrence for thousands
of asbestos claims where the policies had self-insurance features between $100,000 and
$200,000 per occurrence); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
707 F. Supp. 762, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (the policyholder argued for a single occurrence for
hundreds of asbestos claims where the policies had per occurrence self-insurance features
between $50,000 and $200,000), order aff’d in part, vacated in part, 25 F.3d 177 (3d Cir.
1994).
182. See, e.g., KENNETH ABRAHAM &DANIEL SCHWARCZ,INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION
493 (6th ed. 2015) (“Some version of the cause test is dominant, however, although New
York and some other states refer to their cause tests as the ‘unfortunate event’ or ‘triggering
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test essentially considers how many “causes” of the damage or injuries there
are.183 Under the cause test, a single cause can give rise to hundreds or
thousands of injuries and claims.184 The effects test looks at how many effects
or injuries resulted.185 Thus, a court could treat an accident that gives rise
to multiple injuries and claims as multiple occurrences under the effects
test, but a single occurrence under the cause test.186
Both tests are subject to manipulation, and commentators have noted that
some courts have a tendency to apply the tests in such a way as to maximize
the policyholder’s recovery.187 Of course, courts’ sympathetic tendencies
to policyholders in other factual contexts may not apply to a wealthy entity
such as the NFL188 if the evidence proves the NFL concealed or downplayed
the risk of long-term brain injuries from NFL players.189

event’ test. . . . The effects test, adopted by a few courts, vastly expands coverage in most,
but not all, multiple injury cases.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 19, at 518–19 (“The
majority rule follows the ‘cause analysis’: the number of occurrences depends on the number
of causes. If there is one cause (such as one loss of control of a vehicle or one release of
drugs into the market), there is one occurrence. . . . The minority rule, found mostly in older
cases, follows ‘effect analysis’: the situation is viewed from the perspective of the injured
party, so that multiple results constitute multiple occurrences.”); KALIS ET AL., supra note
19, § 3.03[B] (“Two principal competing tests [to determine the number of occurrences]
have emerged: the ‘cause’ test and the ‘effect’ test.”).
183. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.03[B][1]; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 19, at 518.
184. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.03[B][1][a].
185. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.03[B][2]; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 19, at 519.
186. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.03[B][1]–[2]; JERRY & RICHMOND,
supra note 19, at 518–19.
187. See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.03[B][3] (“[S]ome courts have even
acknowledged explicitly that the amount a policyholder will recover is a factor to be considered
in the number of occurrences determination.” (citing Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (D.D.C. 1984))); Owens-Ill., 597 F. Supp. at 1527 (“If [the
policyholder] were obligated to pay a deductible on each claimant’s lawsuit, [the policyholder]
would be deprived of the security for which it paid. Such an interpretation would effectively
emasculate the coverage purchased by [the policyholder] since no individual claim exceeds the
amount of the deductible. On the other hand, the single occurrence interpretation maintains
[the policyholder]’s reasonable expectations.”).
188. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 44 at 159 (“Some may say, with annual revenues
exceeding $10 billion, the NFL can afford it either way.”).
189. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D.
351, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citations omitted) (“Through the MTBI Committee, the NFL
Parties allegedly obfuscated the connection between NFL Football and long-term brain
injury, despite knowing ‘for decades’ that such a connection exists. The MTBI Committee
also allegedly pressured those who criticized its conclusions to retract or otherwise distance
themselves from their findings. MDL Plaintiffs claim that, ‘[b]efore June of 2010, the NFL
made material misrepresentations to its players, former players, the United States Congress, and
the public at large that there was no scientifically proven link between repetitive traumatic
head impacts and later-in-life cognitive/brain injury.’” (quoting Complaint at ¶¶ 108, 243,
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1. Number of Occurrences Under New York Law
New York courts use a version of the “cause” test known as the “unfortunate
events” test to determine the number of occurrences. It was first articulated
in Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America,190
and later was held applicable to the term “occurrence” in Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Wesolowski.191 Under this test, an occurrence is “an event
of an unfortunate character that takes place without one’s foresight or
expectation,” rather than the preceding cause of such an event.192 Thus, the
number of occurrences is determined by the number of unfortunate events
that result in claims.
In practice, the application of the test can yield results similar to the
“effects” test. For example, in explaining how the “unfortunate events” test
works, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
[S]everal factors emerge as relevant to distinguishing injuries or losses that arise
from a single occurrence as opposed to those that constitute multiple occurrences:
whether there is a close temporal and spatial relationship between the incidents
giving rise to injury or loss, and whether the incidents can be viewed as part of
the same causal continuum, without intervening agents or factors.193

The court then applied the test in the context of long-tail asbestos-related
bodily injury claims arising out of alleged exposure to asbestos from the
policyholder’s turbines and concluded that “there were unquestionably
multiple occurrences.”194
In the context of the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation, it is not difficult
to imagine each player’s claim being treated as an “unfortunate event” that

308, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (No. 2:12-md-023230-AB))).
190. See Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 164 N.E.2d 704, 708
(N.Y. 1959).
191. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d 907, 910 (N.Y.
1973).
192. See Arthur A. Johnson Corp., 164 N.E.2d at 707–08 (citing Croshier v. Levitt,
157 N.E.2d 486, 491 (N.Y. 1959)) (holding the collapse of two retaining walls about an
hour apart during a heavy rainfall constituted two “accidents” for the purpose of insurance
coverage).
193. Appalachian Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 863 N.E.2d 994, 999 (N.Y. 2007).
194. Id. at 1001. In recent years, the New York Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the
continued use of the unfortunate events test to determine the number of occurrences under
New York law. See Roman Catholic Diocese v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 991 N.E.2d
666, 671–73 (N.Y. 2013) (applying the unfortunate events test to conclude that the incidents of
sexual abuse in the underlying action constituted multiple occurrences).
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gives rise to an occurrence. Nor is it hard to imagine the court treating each
concussion or blow to the head a player suffered throughout his career as
an “unfortunate event.” Whether such a result would favor the NFL or the
insurers depends upon the policies’ deductibles/SIRs and limits of coverage.
For example, if the amount the NFL pays is a high amount—$5 million for
each ALS claim—the policies have high or no aggregate limits, and the per
occurrence deductible is small—$25,000—then such a result might favor
the NFL. If, on the other hand, most of the claim amounts paid are small
and the policies have high deductibles or low aggregate limits, then the
result would favor the insurers.
2. Number of Occurrences Under Pennsylvania Law
In 2007, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the “cause” test in
Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Baumhammers,195 in which the court found
only a single occurrence—the parents’ failure to take away a firearm from
their mentally ill son or to warn the police—in a situation where their son
shot and killed five people over the course of several hours in multiple
locations. In 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated its support
of the cause test in Kinney-Lindstrom v. Medical Care Availability &
Reduction of Error Fund.196
Under the “cause” test, it is not difficult to imagine that either the NFL
or the insurers, depending upon which side the argument favors, could
successfully argue that a single occurrence caused the players’ delayedmanifestation brain diseases. For example, the single occurrence could be
the NFL’s alleged failure to adopt better rules to protect players, or the
NFL’s alleged failure to share its knowledge regarding the connection
between repeated blows to the head and long-term brain diseases, or the
NFL’s alleged failure to warn the players of the risk of long-term brain
diseases due to repeated blows to the head. The factfinder could view any
one of these “causes,” or another one, as the occurrence that gave rise to the
thousands of NFL player brain diseases and subsequent claims.

195. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 294, 296 (Pa. 2007)
(“We agree with the Superior Court’s adoption of the ‘cause’ approach for determining what
constitutes an ‘occurrence’ pursuant to an insurance policy.”).
196. Kinney-Lindstrom v. Med. Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund, 73
A.3d 543, 556 (Pa. 2013) (“[T[here is no reason for ‘occurrence’ to be construed in the
MCARE Act in a manner markedly different from the way the term was interpreted
in Donegal . . . Accordingly, we hold that the number of occurrences under Section 715
is determined by examining whether there is one or multiple instances of professional
negligence that caused the harm alleged; the number of victims of the medical malpractice
is not controlling when considering the MCARE Fund’s liability limit.” (footnote omitted)).
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E. “Expected or Intended” Exclusion
The “expected or intended” exclusion can trace its roots to the “fortuity”
doctrine in the property insurance context. Although the term “fortuity”
does not appear in insurance policies, some courts historically have incorporated
this term into property insurance policies as an implied exclusion—non
fortuitous property losses implicitly are not covered.197 The Restatement
(First) of Contracts defines “fortuity” as follows:
A fortuitous event . . . is an event which so far as the parties to the contract are
aware, is dependent on chance. It may be beyond the power of any human being
to bring the event to pass; it may be within the control of third persons; it may
even be a past event, such as the loss of a vessel, provided that the fact is unknown
to the parties.198

The fortuity doctrine made its way into CGL insurance policies when
insurers added the “neither expected nor intended language” into the definition
of an “occurrence” 199 and, since 1986, as the “expected or intended”
exclusion.200 The fortuity doctrine also has some support as a matter of public
policy—society wants to deter conduct that causes injuries—so there is an
argument that insurance should not be permitted to cover injuries the
policyholder intentionally causes.201
197. See generally Stephen A. Cozen & Richard C. Bennett, Fortuity: The Unnamed
Exclusion, 20 FORUM 222 (1984) (describing the history and use of the fortuity doctrine).
198. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. A (AM. LAW. INST. 1932); see
also Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir.
1983) (citation omitted); Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 454 N.E.2d 1156, 1164 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983).
199. See Bay Cities Paving & Grading v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263,
1269 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Mich. Chem. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374,
378 (6th Cir. 1984)); supra Part II.D.
200. Some version of the “expected or intended” exclusion has been included in all
of ISO’s occurrence-based and claims-made CGL Coverage Forms since 1986. See MALECKI,
supra note 31, app. B–C, E–G, I–J; see also Kristin Wilcox, Note, Intentional Injury Exclusion
Clauses – What is Insurance Intent?, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1986) (noting that
many “homeowner’s insurance policies exclude coverage for injuries caused intentionally
by the insured”). In an example of the complexity and sometimes inconsistency of liability
insurance, CGL policies also expressly cover numerous intentional torts under the
Advertising and Personal Injury coverage provisions of the policies. See, e.g., MALECKI, supra
note 31, app. J §§ I.1.a, V.14, at 471, 479; Christopher C. French, The Insurability of
Claims for Restitution, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 641–42 (2016) (discussing coverage under
CGL policies for intentional torts such as defamation and invasion of privacy, and the
public policy arguments in favor of and against allowing such coverage).
201. See, e.g., H. Karen Cuttler, Comment, Liability Insurance for Intentional Torts—
Subrogation of the Insurer to the Victim’s Rights Against the Insured: Ambassador Insurance

939

FRENCH (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2018 3:07 PM

When attempting to understand and apply the exclusion, however, a few
questions arise. For example, what exactly must the policyholder expect
or intend in order for the exclusion to apply—the actions that gave rise to
the injury or the resulting injury itself? And, should the policyholder’s
expectations and intentions be analyzed from a subjective or an objective
point of view?
With respect to the first question, the majority of courts hold that in order
for the exclusion to apply the resulting injury or damage must be expected
or intended—not the act giving rise to the injury or damage.202 On the
other end of the spectrum, a minority of jurisdictions follow the rule that

Co. v. Montes, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 155, 157 (1979) (stating that courts have refused to
allow insurance to indemnify losses caused by intentional acts because such indemnity is
against public policy); Peter Nash Swisher & Richard C. Mason, Liability Insurance Coverage
for Clergy Sexual Abuse Claims, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 368 (2011) (“The underlying
public policy rationale of this ‘intentional act exclusion’ in liability insurance is that it would
defeat the purpose of insurance and encourage ‘moral hazard’ if a policyholder could be
compensated for losses he intentionally brings about, knowing that the insurer would be
liable for any resulting damages or personal injury.” (citing W. Nat’l Assurance Co. v.
Heckler, 719 P.2d 954, 959–60 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986))).
202. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Talhouni, 604 N.E.2d 689, 691 (Mass. 1992) (“The
focus in these cases is whether the insured ‘intended’ the injury, not whether the insured
‘intended’ the act.” (citing Newton v. Krasnigor, 536 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Mass. 1989)));
White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (explaining that, although some
damages are foreseeable, “damages not intentionally inflicted but resulting from an
insured’s negligence . . . may be caused by accident and within the coverage afforded by
a liability insurance policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. RapidAm. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 510 (N.Y. 1993) (“Resulting damage can be unintended even
though the act leading to the damage was intentional. A person may engage in behavior
that involves a calculated risk without expecting that an accident will occur.” (first citing
McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 358, 364 (Ct. App. 1975); and then citing
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 78 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1948))); Grand River Lime Co. v.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (recognizing that the term
occurrence is broader than the term “accident” and may encompass a fully intended action
that resulted in unintended damage); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 420–
21 (S.C. 1994) (explaining that an intentional injury exclusion did not bar coverage where
the insured had not intended the injury resulting from his voluntary act); Richard L. Fruehauf,
Note, The Cost of Knowledge: Making Sense of “Nonfortuity” Defenses in Environmental
Liability Insurance Coverage Disputes, 84 VA. L. REV. 107, 131 (1998) (“Courts have had
to decide whether the phrase ‘neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured’
requires an objective or subjective ‘expectation’ on the part of the insured for coverage to
be precluded. The majority of courts to consider the language have held that it imposes a
subjective test for the insured’s expectation . . . .” (first citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058–59 (8th Cir. 1979); then Honeycomb Sys., Inc. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 1400, 1404 (D. Me. 1983); and then Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Pacchetti, 808 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Mo. 1991))); Swisher & Mason, supra note 201,
at 376 (“Whether an accidental event occurred for the purpose of liability insurance coverage
usually is considered from the viewpoint of the tortfeasor-insured.” (first citing Capitol
Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (D. Nev. 1999); and then citing Agoado
Realty Corp. v. United Int’l Ins. Co., 733 N.E.2d 213, 216 (N.Y. 2000))).

940

FRENCH (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 53: 901, 2016]

10/22/2018 3:07 PM

Concussion Liabilities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

if any injury or damage is expected or intended, then the policyholder loses
coverage even if the injury or damage that resulted is different than what
the policyholder expected or intended.203 The middle ground, followed by
some jurisdictions, is that coverage is not lost if the policyholder expected
an injury or damage that was different than, or significantly less severe than,
what actually occurred.204
With respect to the second question, the majority rule is that the insurer
must prove that the policyholder subjectively expected or intended to cause
the resulting injury, as opposed to the policyholder objectively should have
expected or intended to cause the injury at issue.205 In the minority of
203. See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 438, 439 (Colo.
App. 2006) (explaining that the intentional act exclusion applies “whenever some injury
is intended, even though the injury that actually results differs in character or degree from
the injury actually intended” (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 816 P.2d 952, 955 (Colo. 1991))); Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934, 939 (Colo.
App. 1976) (holding in an assault case that where the insured “intentionally struck the
plaintiff, he must be deemed to have intended the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
actions”); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Purvis, 444 S.E.2d 109, 110 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (concluding that an intentional act exclusion is applicable where “the insured acts
with the intent or expectation that . . . injury occur, even if the actual, resulting injury is
different either in kind or magnitude from that intended or expected” (quoting Stein v.
Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 510, 511–12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985))); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Johnson, 466 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (“Once intended harm is
established, the fact of an unintended injury is irrelevant.”); Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Kment, 658 N.W.2d 662, 668 (Neb. 2003) (“In order for the intentional or expected injury
exclusion in a liability insurance policy to apply, the insurer must show that the insured
acted with the specific intent to cause harm to a third party, but does not have to show that
the insured intended the specific injury that occurred.”).
204. See, e.g., Yount v. Maisano, 627 So. 2d 148, 152 (La. 1993) (“[W]hen minor injury
is intended, and a substantially greater or more severe injury results, whether by choice,
coincidence, accident, or whatever, coverage for the more severe injury is not barred.”
(quoting Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 614 (La. 1989))); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n
v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“Our interpretation affords maximum
coverage to insured persons as coverage is precluded only for harm of the same general
type as that which they set out to inflict.”).
205. Compare U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. 1985)
(“[T]he legal standard to determine whether the injury was either expected or intended . . .
is a purely subjective standard.”), and Fire Ins. Exch. v. Berray, 694 P.2d 191, 194 (Ariz. 1984)
(explaining that the court looks “from the standpoint of the insured” to determine whether
the insured “expected or intended” to cause injury), and Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss
Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 861 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the objective “should have
known” meaning of “expect” and instead adopting the word’s “plain meaning”), and State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 925 P.2d 785, 794 (Colo. 1996) (rejecting the insurer’s
“objective viewpoint” argument and addressing the issue from the viewpoint of the insured),
and Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (“[T]he subjective intent
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jurisdictions that apply an objective standard, there are a few variations of
the test. In one version, the policyholder loses coverage if a “reasonable”
person would have expected the injury at issue.206 Under another version,
the policyholder forfeits coverage if the policyholder knew or should have
known that there was a “substantial probability” its actions would result
in the injury at issue,207 with “substantial probability” defined as whether
“a reasonably prudent man” would know that adverse “results are highly
likely to occur.”208
1. Expected or Intended Exclusion Under New York Law
The New York Court of Appeals has not directly addressed the issue of
whether to use an objective test or subjective test to determine whether the
“expected or intended” exclusion applies. Case law support for both

of the insured is the key and not what the average or ordinary reasonable person would
expect or intend.”), and Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 892 (Me.
1981) (adopting a subjective standard and recognizing it as the majority standard), and
Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 469 N.E.2d 797, 800 (Mass. 1984) (“Our cases
have concluded that an injury is non-accidental only where the result was actually, not
constructively, intended . . . .”), and Espinet v. Horvath, 597 A.2d 307, 309 (Vt. 1991)
(upholding a subjective standard and rejecting the use of an objective standard with respect
to “inherently dangerous activity” where such activity was not explicitly excluded by the
insurance policy), and Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d
703, 714 (Wash. 1994) (holding that a subjective standard applies), and Farmers & Mechs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 807 (W. Va. 2001) (“[C]ourts must use a subjective
rather than objective standard for determining the policyholder’s intent.”), with City of Carter
Lake, 604 F.2d at 1058–59 (using an objective standard of “knew or should have known”
in determining if a result was “expected”), and In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 870 F.
Supp. 1293, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (“Texas law determines an insured’s intention ‘objectively’
and not ‘subjectively.’”). See also BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK
ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 8.03[c] (14th ed. 2008).
206. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 717 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981)
(“[I]n determining whether the damages were expected under the terms of the policy the
appropriate standard to be applied is an objective one, i.e., whether a reasonable man in
the position of the insured would have expected the damage to occur.”); City of Carter
Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 (asking, for purposes of determining coverage, “[i]f the insured
knew or should have known that there was a substantial probability that certain results would
follow his acts or omissions”); In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 870 F. Supp. at 1321
(applying Texas law and explaining that the objective standard focuses on “what the insured
knew or should have known”); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 205, § 8.03[c].
207. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 205, § 8.03[c].
208. City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 n.4; see also King v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between standards
of “reasonably foreseeable” and “substantial probability” and expressing, “the latter requires
not only that a reasonably prudent person would be alerted to the possibility of results
occurring, but that such a reasonable person would be forewarned that the results are
‘highly likely to occur’” (quoting City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 n.4)).
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an “objective” test209 and the “subjective” test can be found under New York
law.210
With respect to which party has the burden of proof regarding the NFL’s
expectations or intentions, it may depend upon whether the court analyzes
the pre-1986 or post-1986 policies. As discussed in Part II.D of this Article,
the expected or intended language moved from the insuring agreement to
the exclusions section of CGL policies in 1986. In most states, that is
unimportant because the courts treat the language as an exclusion regardless
of its location.211 Under New York law, however, some cases place the

209. See, e.g., Hereford Ins. Co. v. Segal, 835 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 2007)
(“[T]here is no insurance coverage under the terms of the policy if [the policyholder] reasonably
expected that his own conduct would cause the resulting injury, or if the injuries that [the
third-party victim] sustained were ‘expected or intended’ or could not fairly be characterized as
unexpected, unusual or unforeseen.” (citations omitted)); Utica Fire Ins. Co. v. Shelton,
641 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (App. Div. 1996) (“Applying these principals to the particular facts
of the instant case, it is clear that Naviloff’s eye injuries were to be reasonably expected
by Shelton when he punched him in the eye.”); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
577 N.Y.S.2d 953, 959 (App. Div. 1992) (applying an objective standard to an “occurrence”
definition and stating that “damages are expected if the insured knew or should have
known that they were substantially probable”); Moreau v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 568
N.Y.S.2d 466, 468 (App. Div. 1991) (citing Broome favorably); County of Broome v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622 (App. Div. 1989) (“[P]roperty damages are
expected if the actor knew or should have known there was a substantial probability that a
certain result would take place.” (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 719–20)).
210. See, e.g., Agoado Realty Corp. v. United Int’l Ins. Co., 95 N.Y.2d 141, 145 (N.Y.
2000) (“[I]n deciding whether a loss is the result of an accident, it must be determined, from the
point of view of the insured, whether the loss was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.”);
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 510 (N.Y. 1993) (“For an occurrence
to be covered under the [insurer’s] policies, the injury must be unexpected and
unintentional. We have read such policy terms narrowly, barring recovery only when the
insured intended the damages.” (citing McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 329 N.E.2d 172
(N.Y. 1975))); Union Carbide Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 955 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575
(App. Div. 2012) (“Plaintiff’s ‘calculated risk’ in manufacturing its products despite its
awareness of possible injuries and claims does not amount to an expectation of damage.”);
Siagha v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 762 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47–48 (App. Div. 2003)
(citing Agoado, 95 N.Y.2d at 145, that whether a loss was an accident must be determined
from the point of view of the insured); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ho, 735 N.Y.S.2d 286,
(App. Div. 2001) (citing Agoado, 95 N.Y.2d at 145); Zurich Ins. Co. v. White, 633
N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (App. Div. 1995) (“[W]e find that [the policyholder] clearly intended
to paint the bridge but by virtue of the acts undertaken both before and after the claims of
overspraying were revealed, did not intend to cause the resultant damages. . . . [Therefore,
we find that] the damage was neither ‘intended’ nor ‘expected’ from the standpoint of the
insured.” (citation omitted)).
211. See supra note 67.
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burden of proof on the policyholder when the expected or intended language
is found in the definition of “occurrence,” as it was prior to 1986.212
Thus, for pre-1986 policies, the NFL may need to prove that it did not expect
or intend its players would suffer long-term brain diseases as a result of
playing football. For the post-1986 policies, after the insurers moved the
expected or intended language to the exclusions section of CGL policies,
the insurers would have the burden of proving the NFL expected or intended
that NFL players would develop long-term brain diseases.213 With that said,
it may not be particularly important which party has the burden of proof
on the issue, however, because both sides likely will introduce evidence on
the issue and the factfinder will decide which side’s position has more
credibility.
With respect to the issue of exactly what type of harm the NFL needed
to expect or intend in order for it to lose coverage, New York law again is
mixed regarding whether a showing that the NFL expected or intended the
specific harm suffered—in this instance, CTE—or only that some type of
long-term injury to the brain could or would occur. Some New York case
law supports the argument that only the intent or expectation of harm in
general satisfies the exclusion.214 On the other hand, other case law supports
the argument that the policyholder must have expected or intended the
same type of harm that resulted in order for the exclusion to apply.215

212. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687,
691–92 (N.Y. 2002) (“In our view, the contention that the requirement of an ‘accident’ or
‘occurrence’ itself operates as an exclusion is unpersuasive. Any language providing coverage
for certain events of necessity implicitly excludes other events. Indeed, virtually all of the
language in the policies following the initial grant of coverage has the effect of limiting
the scope of coverage in one way or another.” (citation omitted)).
213. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 3 F. Supp. 3d 79,
98 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (the insurer had the burden to prove that the injuries were expected or
intended by the policyholder); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 477
N.Y.S.2d 657, 660–61 (App. Div. 1984) (“It is the insurer which has the burden of proof
to establish that a claim is encompassed by an exclusion in a policy . . . and any limitation
in coverage must be described in clear and explicit language.” (citations omitted)), aff’d,
478 N.E.2d 1305 (N.Y. 1985); Union Carbide Corp., 955 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (“Since plaintiff
established coverage, the burden shifted to defendants to show that, pursuant to the policy’s
exclusion, plaintiff intended the damages.” (citation omitted)).
214. See, e.g., Monter v. CNA Ins. Cos., 608 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (App. Div. 1994)
(coverage was barred where persons hired to break another person’s legs actually killed
the man instead, because the harm was inherent in the nature of the acts alleged such that
“whatever injuries occurred” from the assault were intentionally caused).
215. See, e.g., Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d at 510 (“For an occurrence to be covered
under the CNA policies, the injury must be unexpected and unintentional. We have read
such policy terms narrowly, barring recovery only when the insured intended the damages.
Resulting damage can be unintended even though the act leading to the damage was
intentional.” (citing McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 358, 364 (Ct. App.
1975))); McGroarty, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (“[A] broader view must be taken of the term for
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For purposes of discussion and to contrast New York and Pennsylvania
law, this Article will assume that New York state court judges would apply
the objective test and only require the insurers to prove that the NFL knew
or should have known that repeated blows to the head that its players receive
could cause some long-term brain diseases. Can the insurers meet that
standard? Perhaps.
If the insurers can prove the allegations in the NFL players’ class action
complaints are true, then yes. As discussed in Part I.B of this Article,
the players alleged that the NFL “fostered a culture surrounding football
that glorified violence and a gladiator mentality, encouraging NFL players
to play despite head injuries.”216 The players also alleged that the NFL
created a committee in 1994 to study the effects of concussive and subconcussive injuries on the players and then “obfuscated the connection between
NFL Football and long-term brain injury, despite knowing ‘for decades’
that such a connection exists.”217 In addition, the players alleged that the NFL
misrepresented to its players, the public, and Congress that “‘there was no
scientifically proven link between repetitive traumatic head impacts and
later-in-life cognitive/brain injury.’”218 If the insurers can prove all of those
allegations, then the NFL could potentially lose all of its coverage after the
date it acquired such knowledge due to the policies’ “expected or intended”
exclusion.
2. Expected or Intended under Pennsylvania Law
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
the issue, the intermediate appellate court has used the subjective test to
determine whether the “expected or intended” exclusion applies, but only
requires that the policyholder expect or intend some harm of the general

otherwise how could we classify catastrophic results which are the unintended fruits of willful
conduct? Certainly one may intend to run a red light, but not intend that the catastrophic
result of collision with another car occur. Calculated risks can result in accidents.”); Union
Carbide Corp., 955 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (“Plaintiff’s ‘calculated risk’ in manufacturing its
[asbestos-containing] products despite its awareness of possible injuries and claims does
not amount to an expectation of damage.” (citing Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d at 510)).
216. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351,
362 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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type suffered, as opposed to the precise harm that resulted.219 The insurer
has the burden of proof on the issue.220
Would the outcome regarding the applicability of the “expected or intended”
exclusion in the NFL v. Insurance Industry litigation under Pennsylvania
law be different than under New York law? Again, perhaps.
Regardless of which party has the burden of proof, if the insurers prove
the more egregious NFL players’ allegations discussed above are true—if
the NFL actually knew of the risks of long-term brain diseases due to repeated
blows to the head, but concealed that information from the players and the
publicthen the exclusion likely would apply under both New York and
Pennsylvania law. Similarly, because both states only require a showing of
an intent or expectation of the same general type of harm, it probably would
not be important whether the NFL knew or should have known about CTE
specifically, for example, if it did know that repetitive blows to the head
cause other types of long-term brain diseases and then failed to warn or protect
the players.
There is, however, a real difference between subjective knowledge or
intent and objective knowledge or intent. Actual knowledge or intent is
different than should have known or expected. So, if the evidence does not
support the conclusion that the NFL actually knew about the risks of long
term brain diseases, but that the NFL should have known based upon the
available medical studies, then the outcomes could be different under New
York and Pennsylvania law.

219. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(“In our state, the exclusionary clause applies only when the insured intends to cause a
harm. Insurance coverage is not excluded because the insured’s actions are intentional
unless he also intended the resultant damage . . . The exclusion is inapplicable even if the
insured should reasonably have foreseen the injury which his actions caused . . . Eisenman
appears to align Pennsylvania with those jurisdictions which hold that the exclusion
applies if the insured intended to cause a harm of the same general type as that which did
occur.” (first citing Mohn v. Am. Cas. Co., 326 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1974); and then citing Eisenman
v. Hornberger, 264 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1970))); see also Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy,
33 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Pennsylvania has adopted a general liability standard . . .
that looks to the insured’s actual subjective intent.” (citing Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
995 F.2d 457, 460 (3d Cir. 1993))).
220. See Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1446 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he insurer bears the burden of proving the applicability of any exclusions or limitations on
coverage, since disclaiming coverage on the basis of an exclusion is an affirmative defense. Our
research has revealed no Pennsylvania case allocating the burden of proof on the fortuity
requirement. We nonetheless predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would place
the burden on the insurer in this case.” (citation omitted)); see also Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Cont’l Cas. Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1179 (Pa. 2001) (holding the insurer bears the burden of proof
regarding the defenses of fraud and “known loss,” which are other types of fortuity defenses).

946

FRENCH (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2018 3:07 PM

Concussion Liabilities

[VOL. 53: 901, 2016]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

CONCLUSION
Five major issues most likely will dictate the outcome of the $1 billion NFL
v. Insurance Industry battle: (1) choice of law, (2) “trigger,” (3) “allocation,”
(4) “number of occurrences,” and (5) the “expected or intended” exclusion.
How these issues are resolved will determine which insurers, if any, must
pay for the NFL’s liabilities and what portion of the NFL’s $1 billion in
liabilities each insurer will be required to pay. The outcome could be
dramatically different depending upon whether the court applies New York
law or the law of another state such as Pennsylvania. Although New York
is the NFL’s home field, in this insurance battle, the NFL probably would
prefer to be playing a road game.
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